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CHAPTER I 
THE RESEARCH PROBLEM 
Introduction 
The importance of qualified opinions to the stock market has been 
the subject of a number of prior studie~ which have obtained conflic-
ting results. Most of these studies tested the relationship between a 
"subject to" qualification and market returns. However, three studies 
addressed the relationship between the opinion and a company's risk. 
These risk studies were plagued by methodological problems, which sug-
gests that the question of whether a relationship exists may not have 
been adequately addressed by previous research. The purpose of this 
study is to avoid the methodological problems of the earlier risk stud-
ies and to determine whether "subject to" qualifications are associated 
with a change in the risk of a company. 
The "subject to" qualification, issued when material uncertainties 
affect the financial statements, was recently eliminated by the Ameri-
can Institute of Certified Public Accountants' Audit Standards Board. 
Statement of Auditing Standards (SAS) 58 and 59 eliminated the "subject 
to" wording and the qualification of the audit report for loss contin-
gencies and questionable going concern status. However, these two new 
standards still call for specific modifications of audit reports. The 
audit report now contains a paragraph explaining the uncertainty, stat-
ing that the outcome is unknown, and referring the reader to the appro-
1 
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priate financial statement footnotes. Under the new standards, the 
wording of the opinion is the same for companies with and without mate-
rial uncertainties, resulting in the issuance of a "clean" opinion for 
both. However, the presence of an explanatory paragraph should act as 
a signal to notify statement users that a material difference exists. 
Theoretically, this signal should convey information identical to the 
information previously conveyed by the "subject to" wording. Therefore, 
even though the "subject to" wording has been changed, the new treat-
ment should not change the effect of such uncertainties on the market. 
The difference appears to be only one of the location of the disclosure 
in the statements. Due to data availability, this study necessarily 
includes only those companies with "subject to" opinion wording. 
Research Objective 
The "subject to" qualification was the topic of a number of 
studies after its recommended elimination by the Commission on 
Auditors' Responsibilities (also known as the Cohen Commission) [Com-
mission on Auditors' Responsibilities, 1977]. Some studies looked at 
risk shifts, while others looked at market returns. In the early re-
turn studies, researchers attempted to find abnormal returns at the 
time of the issuance of the opinion. For example, Ball, Walker and 
Whittred [1979] found no significant returns around the opinion issu-
ance date. Others (such as Banks and Kinney [1982] and Dodd, Dopuch, 
Holthausen and Leftwich [1986]) measured the abnormal returns over a 
longer event window, from thirty-nine weeks to two years around the 
issuance. In one of these studies, Brown and Levitan [1986] found an 
indication that companies receiving qualifications had lower cumulative 
average residuals (CARS) than those which did not receive qualified 
opinions. 
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Craswell [1985] and Bailey [1982] criticized the return studies 
for measuring the effects of more than just the qualified opinion on 
the market. These studies intended to determine the information con-
tent of qualified opinions and the events that caused them, but failed 
to segregate this effect from the effects of other differences on the 
market. This failure may be the cause of the inconsistent results ob-
tained in the return studies. The various differences between the con-
trol and experi~ental groups may be causing offsetting effects in some 
cases, resulting in no abnormal re.turns over the period investigated. 
In addition, Craswell [1985] criticized the methodologies of the early 
return studies for the use of event windows which were too short to 
capture the total effect of the qualified opinion release. 
Two of the early risk studies were also subject to the criticism 
of Craswell [1985] regarding the use of short event windows, Alderman 
[1977] which found no change in the systematic risk of a company, and 
Shank, Murdock and Dillard [1982] which noted a change in systematic 
risk after the issuance of a qualified opinion. Each of these studies 
utilized a short event window and therefore may have missed some or all 
of the risk reaction.to the events causing the qualification. The only 
other risk study, Finnerty and Oliver [1985], which noted a significant 
change in beta (a measure of systematic risk), is subject to other 
methodological criticisms regarding the event periods selected and the 
lack of a control group. 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether "subject to" 
qualifications, issued for questionable going concern status and for 
loss contingencies, are associated with a change in the risk of a com-
pany. This study improves upon the previous risk studies by using an 
observation period that surrounds the possible times that the market 
may have obtained knowledge regarding the events resulting in the 
qualified opinion. In addition, this study selects a control group 
with more similarities to the experimental group than other studies. 
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In only one of these studies, Brown and Levitan [1986], was an appro-
priate control group used. However, other methodological improvements 
on the Brown and Levitan study are made while focusing on the change in 
risk instead of'abnormal returns. 
Importance of the Problem 
This study helps to answer an important question in auditing, 
whether an auditor's report'containing a "red flag", such as the 
"subject to" qualified opinion, serves a purpose in financial report-
ing. As stated earlier, many studies have addressed this problem with 
questionable success. 
If no purpose is served by its usage, then there is a basis for 
the discontinuance of OJdnions containing "red flags" for cases of 
uncertainty and questionable going concern. The discontinuance of such 
an opinion would make the auditor's job easier and less costly as the 
auditor would no longer have to use resources to convince the client 
that a special opinion is necessary. 
If, on the other hand, the answer to the above question is posi-
tive, more research needs to be performed. Future testing of post- SAS 
58 and SAS 59 data should be carried out to ensure that the change from 
the "subject-to" wording causes no differences in risk effects. Addi-
tionally, behavioral studies should be conducted to test individual 
reaction to the new opinion types, as well as to other possible "red 
flag" reports, and compare them to the reaction to the "subject to" 
opinion in order to determine which is the more effective signal for 
investors. 
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As is evidenced by the number of studies published in this area, 
much discussion and research have been focused on this question, 
suggesting the importance of the subject. A study which eliminates the 
methodological problems present in earlier studies should provide more 
reliable evidence concerning the relationship between "subject-to" 
opinions and risk. 
The remainder of this dissertation contains five chapters. 
Chapter II consists of a review of the relevant literature. The 
theoretical framework unde!lying this study is developed in Chapter 
III, as well as a statement of the hypotheses. Following that, in 
Chapter IV, is a discussion of the methodology used to conduct the 
research. A presentation and analysis of the results obtained in the 
research is contained in Chapter V. Finally, the conclusions reached 
and the limitations inherent in the study are summarized in Chapter VI. 
CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
Introduction 
The question of what ~elationship exists between "subject to" 
qualified opinions, the returns of companies, and risk'shifts has not 
been answered adequately in past research. Most of the studies con-
ducted have tested for a relationship between stock market returns and 
qualified opinions and have obtained conflicting results. These 
conflicts may be due to either: (1) the use of event windows which are 
too short to capture the effects of the qualification; or (2) the use 
of methodologies which include the impact of other events as well as 
the impact of the qualified opinion and the events leading to it. 
The risk studies have also been subject to varying results. These 
inconsistencies may also be caused by methodological problems. Two of 
the studies suffer from the use of a short event period while the third 
has other methodological problems, such as selection of inappropriate 
beta calculation periods. 
The first section of this chapter discusses both the results and 
the methodological limitations of the return studies. The ten return 
studies are divided by type (length of their event window) for this 
discussion. Next; the results of the risk studies and their method-
ological problems are addressed. A summary of these studies and their 
results is presented in Table I at the end of this chapter. 
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Return Study Results 
Many of the studies concerning qualified opinions have attempted 
to find a relationship between the issuance of the opinion and stock 
market returns. The logic used to justify this research is as follows: 
if the qualified opinion has information content for the market, then 
abnormal stock market returns should be observed at the time the market 
becomes aware of the nature of the opinion. Furthermore, since "sub-
ject to" qualified opinions are related to uncertainties which should 
be viewed as "bad news" by the market, negative abnormal returns 
should, in general, be noted if the qualification has information 
content. 
The ten studies conducted to ,test the relationship between quali-
fied opinions and returns may be divided into three groups. One of 
these groups consists of those studies which actually attempted to 
measure the market effect caused by the opinion when it is issued by 
using a short event window. Next, others studied the return character-
istics for a relatively long period of time up to the opinion issuance, 
sometimes continuing beyond the issuance itself. Another group includ-
ed more than one time period in their studies and fits in both of the 
above categories. 
Short Event Window Studies 
The first group consists of the two earliest return studies, both 
of which used short event windows (about one month on either side of 
the opinion issuance date), Firth [1978] and Ball, Walker, and Whittred 
[1979]. The stated purpose of these two studies was to identify a 
market reaction to the qualified opinion when it was released. 
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The authors obtained conflicting results. Firth [1978] found, in 
a study of United Kingdom companies, significant abnormal negative 
returns associated with the release of certain opinions; e.g., those 
which stated that the financial statements did not present a "true and 
fair view" and those with going concern and asset valuation qualifi-
cations. On the other hand, in an Australian study, Ball, Walker, and 
Whittred [1979] examined the market effects of opinions that mentioned 
a reservation about the "truth and fairness" of the financial state-
ments and found no significant abnormal negative returns. Although the 
two studies included different categories of qualifications, in both 
cases some of the opinions studied would fit into the American defi-
nition of the "subject to" qualification (i.e., litigation and asset 
valuation) as well as those which wo~ld have been considered to be 
"except for" opinions in the United States. 
Craswell [1985] pointed out that the major methodological flaw in 
these studies is the impossibility of determining when the market 
learns about the qualification or the events leading to it. By using a 
short event window and testing for a reaction at the time of the 
opinion issuance, the researchers may have missed much (or all) of the 
reaction to the event. This is compounded by the results of Whittred 
[1980] who found that first 'time qualified opinions delay the release 
of financial statements and noted that, in general, the delay grew as 
the reasons for the qualification became more serious. He concluded 
that with knowledge of a company's usual reporting habits, the market 
would be able to predict the qualified opinion. This finding strength-
ened the argument that the market sometimes anticipates the information 
contained in the qualified opinion and therefore studies utilizing 
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short event windows may miss the market effect. 
Longer Event Window Studies 
The researchers involved in the next group of studies recognized 
the timing problem inherent in the early studies. Instead of measuring 
the market reaction just for a short period of time when the opinion is 
issued (or when the announcement of it was made in the Wall Street 
Journal), they investigated the behavior of the market for a much 
longer period of time surrounding the event. This group of studies 
includes Banks and Kinney [1982], Shank, Murdock and Dillard [1982], 
Brown and Levitan [1986], Dodd, Dopuch, Holthausen and Leftwich [1984) 
and Dopuch, Holthausen and Leftwich [1986]. The event window used in 
these studies ranged from about thirty-nine weeks to two years. 
Again, these return studies reported conflicting results. Banks 
and Kinney [1982] found significantly lower returns for those companies 
with opinions qualified because of loss contingencies than they found 
for those with clean opinions. Likewise, in a study of going concern 
qualifications, Brown and Levitan [1986] observed significant abnormal 
returns on the stocks of companies with qualifications. Dopuch, 
Holthausen and Leftwich [1986] also found abnormal returns around the 
time of the announcement of the issuance of a "subject-to" qualifi-
cation (e.g., litigation, asset valuation, going concern) in the Wall 
Street Journal. However, two of the studies did not achieve such 
significant results. Shank, Murdock and Dillard [1982] noted negative 
abnormal returns only for contingency qualifications issued for litiga-
tion uncertainties. Qualified opinions for asset valuation and going 
concern did not lead to abnormal returns. Dodd, Dopuch, Holthausen and 
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Leftwich [1986], on the other hand, concluded that "subject to" reports 
contain no information content after obtaining no significant results 
in their study. 
These studies did not necessarily measure just the market reaction 
to the qualification itself or the events causing it, but measured the 
market effects of everything that.occurred during that period of time. 
As Craswell '[1985] pointed out, self selection is involved in deter-
mining which companies receive qualified opinions, and as Bailey [1982] 
stated, the~financial statements of companies receiving qualifications 
and their components are inherently different than those of other com-
panies. Therefore, unless an extremely ~areful matching process is 
employed, any number of other events could contribute to these differ-
ences, all of which cannot be attributed to the qualified opinion or 
the events leading t? it. 
The previous studies, with the exception of Brown and Levitan 
[1986], used either no control group or a control group selected on the 
basis on size, industry, etc., but with no regard to the presence of 
contingencies in the financial statements of the control companies (for 
asset valuation and litigation matches) or to the existence of differ-
ent financial statement characteristics (for going concern matches). 
Not all contingencies result in qualification. If the amount of the 
contingent loss is estimable, 'no qualification is necessary. If no 
control group is used, the impact on the market caused by both (1) the 
uncertainty that the loss will occur and (2) the uncertainty regarding 
the amount· of th~ possible loss, is attributed to. the presence of the 
qualification. The existence of a contingency for which no qualifi-
cation is issued should have some impact on risk. As discussed in l 
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Chapter III, loss contingencies by definition involve the uncertainty 
of future returns, even if the amount of the possible loss is known. 
Therefore, by using no control group, too much impact is attributed to 
the presence of the qualification when just the incremental impact 
should be measured (the impact that occurs because the amount of the 
possible loss is unknown). The same is true when using no control 
group for companies with questionable going concern status. Not all 
companies in financial difficulty receive "subject to" opinions. If no 
control group is used, the incremental impact on the market of the 
events resulting in the "subject to" opinion is not measured. 
If control companies, with clean opinions, are selected based upon 
industry, size, etc: and no effort is made to ensure that the companies 
selected have contingencies in their financial statements (for asset 
valuation and litigation) and similar financial characteristics (for 
going concern), the best possible match is probably not being uti-
lized. As stated, comp~nies which receive qualifications are inherent-
ly different than other companies. These companies may have managers 
that make different choices than those made in companies without 
qualifications and/or they 'may be affected differently by events that 
occur. The closest match which minimizes these differences is one in 
which the control company has a contingency of the same nature as the 
experimental company or as similar financial characteristics as possi-
ble to the experimental company. In addition, too much market impact 
is attributed to the qualification because the control group does not 
mitigate the portion of the market effect that is not unique to the 
experimental group. 
Therefore, due to inadequate control procedures, the previous 
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research did not measure the impact of the qualification on the market 
but rather tested whether a significant difference in the returns of 
the two companies was noted, regardless of the source. Other events 
may be causing offsetting market reactions in some cases which could 
result in the insignificant findings noted in some of the studies. 
This point also applies to those studies with short event windows. Due 
to self selection, the difference in the returns found at the time of 
the opinion release may be caused by other difference's between the 
control and experimental groups. 
Combination Studies 
The last group of studies covers those which carried out research 
over both short and long event windows, and again conflicting results 
were found. Chow and Rice [1982] found lower returns over a three 
month period, including the month of report release, for companies with 
qualified opinions as compared to a control group. They did not, 
however, find a large difference when comparing the returns over a 
corresponding twelve month period. In addition, they noted that 
certain types of qualifications, such as asset valuation, were asso-
ciated with greater differences than others, such as those they catego-
rize as "uncertainty qualifications". In fact, the asset valuation 
contingencies were the only ones with statistically significant re-
sults. This contrasts with the findings of Davis [1982], who obtained 
significant results over a 241 day period prior to the opinion, which 
is similar in length to Chow and Rice's twelve month period, but not 
for a shorter twenty-one day period. In the other study of this type, 
Elliott [1982] observed significant differences between the cumulative 
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average residuals of the qualification and control groups for asset 
valuation and going concern qualifications over a forty-five week 
period prior to the release date of the opinion. In addition, in a 
test for abnormal returns occurring during the fourteen weeks after the 
issuance of the qualification, Elliott [1982] found no significant 
results. 
The studies performed by Elliott [1982], Chow and Rice [1982] and 
Davis [1982] used data obtained over both long and short event win-
dows. Therefore, the points made for each of the other two return 
study categories apply to these three studies. 
Conclusion 
Due to the methodological limitations discussed - the lack of 
knowledge regarding when the market obtains information about the 
qualification and the lack of control for the impact of other events -
the question of a relationship between the qualified opinion and market 
returns is difficult to determine. All that can be surmised from the 
studies discussed is that the results obtained (five studies found 
abnormal returns for at least one type of "subject-to" qualification, 
two found no abnormal returns, and three with differing results depend-
ing upon the time period used) may not be inconsistent with the idea 
that shares of companies which receive qualifications have different 
market behavior than shares of companies which obtain clean opinions. 
Many of the return studies show a difference in returns over the 
period, and it is possible that those which do not are a result of 
offsetting market reactions to other events. 
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Risk Studies 
Risk is an important parameter in the pricing of stocks and 
impacts the preferences of investors. Therefore, a study which deter-
mines whether the qualified opinion is associated with a change in risk 
would be beneficial. Beaver [1972] recognized the importance of 
systematic risk and discussed the role of relative risk in the determi-
nation of security prices. He also recognized that investors would be 
concerned with assessing the risk of securities in order to select 
portfolios which would meet their risk preferences. Therefore, system-
atic and total risk are important parameters, and the relationship 
between risk and qualified opinions is worthy of study. 
Results and Methodological Problems 
Prior studies of the relationship between risk and this type of 
qualification have also been subject to conflicting results. Alderman 
[1977] found no significant increase in systematic risk after the 
issuance of a "subject to 11 opinion. On the other hand, for litigation 
related qualifications, Shank, Murdock and Dillard [1982] observed 
significant changes in systematic risk. Another study of the relation-
ship between the systematic portion of risk and qualified opinions, 
Finnerty and Oliver [1985], noted a significant increase in systematic 
risk for some of the companies in their sample which received 11 subject 
to 11 opinions. The only study to address the question of changes in the 
unsystematic portion of risk, Alderman [1977], found no significant 
results. 
These diverse findings have resulted in an inability to determine 
the actual relationship between 11 subject to 11 opinions and market 
returns and risk measures. Methodological problems of the studies 
presented are a possible reason for the diversity of the above listed 
results. 
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The existence of a relationship is not properly addressed by the 
studies conducted by Alderman [1977] and Shank, Murdock and Dillard 
[1982] as they used short event windows and encountered the same 
methodological problem as did the first group of return studies. The 
event windows were so small in these studies that one can not determine 
whether or not any change in systematic risk, resulting from the 
qualification or the, events causing it, was captured. 
Finnerty and Oliver [1985], the only other study involving risk, 
is still subject to methodological problems, although an event window 
of fourteen months is used. First, the event window selected did not 
include all of the possible points of time where the market could have 
learned about the opinion or events causing it. By starting the event 
window with the ninth month of the year (approximately the sixth month 
after the previous year's opinion is issued), and not investigating 
publication sources to help rule out the possibility that the event 
occurred during this six month period, the authors may have missed some 
of the beta effects, (the only risk measure included in the study). In 
addition, by waiting until seven months after the opinion release to 
calculate the second beta, the authors did not. recognize the possi-
bility that the event which caused the qualification may have been 
resolved by then. 
Further, the researchers estimated beta over two twenty-four month 
periods. This long parameter estimation period could introduce insta-
bility into the beta calculation as well as possibly dampening the 
// 
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effects of the qualification on beta. By using such a long time period 
to calculate beta, the authors may have erroneously included in the 
beta calculation period the effects of many other events occurring in 
other accounting periods. In addition, as mentioned above, the event 
which resulted in the qualification may be resolved during the second 
beta calculation period. This could result in improperly measured 
betas since, as theorized, beta should be reduced when such a contin-
gency no longer exists. By including time periods in the calculation 
of beta where the company no longer has a contingency, beta would 
likely be understated. 
Finally, the last criticism of Finnerty and Oliver is one which 
was discussed earlier in the chapter which also applies-to all of the 
studies except for Brown and Levitan [1986]. Finnerty and Oliver used 
no control group in their study resulting in too much uncertainty being 
attributed to the qualification and biasing the outcome in favor of 
finding results. 
Improvements 
Since this research concerns risk shifts over a period of time, 
the question addressed does not require the segregation of the impact 
of the qualification or the events causing it from the aggregate signal 
received by the market. In fact Bailey [1982] stated that it is 
impossible to do so except in the context of a behavioral experiment. 
This study looks for a relationship between the existence of a quali-
fied opinion and a change in the risk of a company over the period in 
question. This does not result in the determination of causality but 
may suggest that the qualified opinion signals to the market that a 
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risk shift has occurred. 
In order to overcome the shortcomings of earlier papers, this 
study uses a control group with characteristics as similar as possible 
to the experimental group. Companies chosen for the control group must 
not only be in the same industry and be of the same size as the experi-
mental companies, but they must also have a contingency in the same 
category (for controls of loss contingency companies) or have similar 
financial characteristics (for controls of going concern companies). 
Brown and Levitan [1986] used a similar matching technique in their 
study of going concern qualifications. In addition, the event window 
includes all possible times that the market could have become aware of 
the opinion. The periods over which systematic and total risk are 
calculated are shorter. Because it is possible that the event could be 
resolved during the second period of risk calculation, publication 
indices are investigated to make sure this did not occur. This results 
in risk calculation periods in which the company retains the same 
contingency situation throughout and is less prone to confounding 
events. 
Summary 
Conflicting results were obtained by the previously conducted 
studies. These differing results may have been caused by methodologi-
cal problems, mainly the selection of inappropriate event windows and 
the lack of control for the impact of other events. 
This study improves upon the methodologies used in the previous 
studies by including in the event window all possible times that the 
market could have learned of the qualified opinion or the underlying 
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event. The control group selection used in this study provides a 
closer match for the experimental companies than did the methodologies 
of the previous studies. Details of the methodology used to conduct 
the research are presented in Chapter IV. The next chapter, Chapter 
III, presents the theoretical framework upon which this study is based. 
AUTHORS 
RETURN STUDIES 
SHORT EVENT WINDOW 
DATA TYPE 
TABLE 1 
SUMMARY OF RISK AND RETURN STUDIES 
METHODOLOGY EVENT WINDOW MATCHING CRITERIA RESULTS 
Ball, Walker, and Australian equivalent excess returns from three weeks before no control group no significant abnormal 
Whittred, 1979 of "subject to", dis- calculated from a to three weeks after the returns noted 
--------------------~~~~~!-~~-~d~=~~~----~2~~~~~2~~~--------2~~~~~!!f~~~!!~=~~~---------------------------------------------------
Firth, 1978 U.K. equivalent of cumulative average 40 days surrounding the industry, size <market small effect for some 
"subject to", "except residuals release of the qualified capitalization), clean qualification types 
for", disclaimer, opinion opinion 
adverse 
RETURN STUDIES 
LONGER EVENT WINDOW 
Banks and Kinney, loss contingencies cumulative average twelve months prior to industry, sign of CARS more negative for 
1982 resulting in "subject residuals the annual report unexpected earnings, companies with "subject 
to" and clean release clean opinion to" opinions 
--------------------~E~~~~n~-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Brown and Levitan, 
1986 
going concern 
"subject to" opinions 
cumulative average 
residuals 
from nine weeks prior to 
thirty after year end 
industry, financial 
position (based upon 
Altman's Z), clean 
CARS more negative for 
companies with 
qualifications 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------~E~~~~~---------------------------~-----------
Dodd, Dopuch, 
Holthausen and 
Leftwich, 1986 
"subject to" opinions 
and disclaimers 
average prediction 
errors 
from 125 days before to no control group no reaction to 11subj ect 
60 days after event, to" opinions, dis-
event is first of the claimer sample too 
10K or report release small to determine 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dopuch, Holthausen 
and Leftwich, 1986 
Wall Street Journal 
disclosures of 
"subject to" opinions 
average prediction 
errors 
from 300 days prior to 
the announcement to 50 
days after it 
no control group negative abnormal 
returns found at the 
time of the WSJ 
announcement 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Shank, Murdock and disclaimer, "subject excess returns from twelve months industry, size (total only significant for 
Dillard, 1982 to" opinions calculated on ex- before to eleven after size), beta, clean litigation 
_________________________________________ P2~!-~~~-----------!=~=~~~~~-~~~~t-~=e~! ____ ~p~~~~~-----------------~2~!~~g:~~~=~----------
AUTHORS 
RETURN STUDIES 
COMBINATION 
Chow and Rice, 1982 
DATA TYPE 
asset valuation and 
uncertainty types of 
"subject to" opinions 
TABLE 1 (Continued) 
METHODOLOGY 
abnormal 
performance index 
EVENT WINDOW 
three months and twelve 
months ending .the month 
after the opinion 
MATCHING CRITERIA 
size (sales), industry, 
auditor, clean opinion 
RESULTS 
significant rela-
tionships for three 
month API's for asset 
realization 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------~--------------------------------------------------------
Davis, 1982 asset valuation and abnormal 21 days around earnings industry, earnings fore- significant results 
·uncertainty types of performance index and opinion releases, cast errors (favorable found for the longer 
"subject to" opinions and non-parametric and from 241 days prior or unfavorable), beta, periods but not for the 
------------------------------------------!~~!~---------------!E_!~~~~Y~-~~t!r_~~~~---~1~~~-opJ~l~~------------~~~~!~_!l~~!J~~----
Elliott, 1982 
RISK STUDIES 
SHORT EVENT WINDOW 
Alderman, 1977 
"subject to" opinions 
"subject to" and 
"except for" opinions 
excess returns 
calculated from an 
ex-post CAPM and a 
market model 
from 45 weeks prior to 
the Wall Street Journal 
earnings release until 
14 weeks after 
frequency and level betas calculated over 
of both components two three year periods, 
of risk (systematic both before and after 
industry and magnitude 
of unexpected earnings, 
clean opinion 
clean opinion. 
c•gnificant results for 
going concern and asset 
valuation contingencies 
for the 45 week period 
no significant impact 
found 
-----------------------------~------------~~~-~~~s~~~!~~L ____ !h~-~~~!~-~~~e~~~-----------------------------------------------------
Shank, Murdock and 
Dillard, 1982 
RISK STUDIES 
LONGER EVENT WINDOW 
Finnerty and 
Oliver, 1985 
disclaimer, "subject 
to" opinions 
"subject to" and 
"except for" opinions 
results from change 
in beta test 
compared with non-
parametric tests 
beta change results 
compared with Chow 
test, Hollander's 
nonparametric test 
betas calculated 24 
months before.and 24 
months after the annual 
report release 
betas calculated over 
two 24 month periods, 
ending 6 months before 
the opinion and star-
ting seven months after 
industry, size, beta, 
clean opinion 
no control group 
change in beta positive 
for the experimental 
group, negative for the 
control group 
more significant beta 
changes than expected 
for tax, litigation and 
one "except for" 
opinion 
N 
0 
CHAPTER III 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Concerning Causality 
The observation of a change in the risk of a stock over the period 
of qualification does not result in the ability to determine caus-
ality. It does, however, allow one to say whether the qualified 
opinion is associated with a change in one of the parameters and may 
therefore signal such a change to the investor. Therefore the theore-
tical framework developed,in this section does not address causality. 
Relationship with To.tal and Systematic Risk 
Risk is defined by Lorie and Hamilton (1973) as a measure of the 
1 degree of uncertainty concerning the future returns on an investment. 
However, it is difficult to determine which is the appropriate measure 
of risk. According to portfolio theory, the only relevant measure of 
risk in the pricing of an asset is the systematic risk or the extent to 
which the returns on the investment move in relation to market returns 
[Fama and Miller, 1972]. Even though the value of the investment does 
not seem to depend directly upon unsystematic risk, total risk (made up 
of both systematic and unsystematic components) is also an important 
characteristic in this case. When the auditor is investigating the 
financial statements of a company containing a loss contingency, he/she 
is issuing an opinion solely about the financial statements of the 
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company in question and not about its relationship to other companies 
in the market. Since the auditor issues his or her report to all 
stockholders and not just those holding efficient, diversified portfo-
lios, the relationship of total risk to loss contingencies and quali-
fied opinions is an important one. Therefore, it seems that both 
systematic and total risk are important parameters and are worthy of 
investigation in relation to qualified opinions. Studies, such as 
Shank, Murdock, and Dillard [1982] and Finnerty and Oliver [1985], 
which investigated the relationship between risk and qualified opinions 
only looked at systematic risk and did not include the unsystematic 
component of risk. Only Alderman [1977] considered the unsystematic 
component and as mentioned earlier, Craswell [1985] criticized the 
study for using an event window which was too short to capture the 
effects of a change. 
By definition, loss contingencies involve the uncertainty of 
future returns. When a loss contingency arises, there is uncertainty 
involving whether or not the loss will actually occur at some future 
date. Evidence of this is provided by the definition of a loss contin-
gency, given by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) in 
Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) No. 5, where it is 
described as a "possible loss". Therefore, it seems reasonable that a 
relationship exists between loss contingencies and the total risk of 
the company. 
The amount of risk for a company may differ when a qualified 
opinion, instead of a clean opinion, is issued because of the presence 
of a loss contingency (as discussed previously, SAS 58 and SAS 59 
recently changed the form of the opinion issued in this case - the 
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wording of this analysis is based upon the rules in effect at the time 
the companies in this study experienced such uncertainties). Ceteris 
paribus, a clean opinion is issued if the amount of the loss contin-
gency is estimable, whereas a qualified opinion is issued if the amount 
of the loss contingency is not estimable and the contingent loss is 
probable or reasonably possible. If the amount of the possible loss 
can be estimated, investors can obviously make a better determination 
of the cash ·flow effect of the loss than if they cannot estimate the 
amount. However, in accordance with efficient markets theory, it seems 
likely that the market will make its best estimate of the amount of the 
cash flow effect even in the absence of a loss estimate from the 
company. This will result in a change in the estimated return on the 
company's stock whether or not the amount is known. A greater effect 
on the company's total risk should occur when the amount cannot be 
estimated (when the qualified opinion is issued). As an efficient 
market revises its beliefs regarding the estimate of the possible loss, 
the amount of expected future cash flows may also change, resulting in 
positive or negative returns to stockholders. As stated above, there 
is some uncertainty inherent in a loss contingency, but the additional 
component of an unknown amount should increase the amount of uncer-
tainty caused by the contingency and result in .a gre~ter change in the 
total risk of the company. 
The events giving rise to a questionable going concern status 
should also be associated with an increase in the total risk of a 
company. A company whose ability to continue i~ questionable should 
have future returns which are more uncertain than a similar company 
which is more likely to continue in existence. The relationship 
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between total risk and "subject to" opinions, caused by both loss 
contingencies and questionable going concern status, is addressed in 
this study. In addition to total risk, the relationship between 
systematic risk and "subject to" qualified opinions is also studied. 
This relationship is an important one because of the effects of system-
atic risk on the pricing of stocks and the preferences of investors 
[Beaver, 1979]. 
It is not possible to make a general statement as to whether 
"subject to" opinions result in the· increased covariance of the indi-
vidual security's 'returns with those of the market. The theoretical 
link between a qualification and the systematic component of risk 
depends upon the underlying reasons for the qualification involved. 
For example, litigation and income tax issues are company specific 
events because the amount of the possible effect on the company is 
determined independently of the economy or general business environ-
ment. On the other hand, uncertainties relating to asset valuation or 
realization tend to make the company more susceptible to changes in the 
general economy, making the company's returns more volatile than before 
in relation to changes in the economic conditions. Questionable going 
concern status may also tend to make the company more easily affected 
by swings in the general economy than experienced by the company 
previously. Therefore, any relationship between systematic risk and 
the issuance of a qualified opinion will also depend upon the reason 
for the "subjec~ to" qualified opinion. 
Statement of Hypotheses 
The empirical evaluation of the relationship between the "subject 
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to" qualified audit opinion and the systematic portion of risk is one 
of the purposes of this study. For qualifications issued for asset 
valuation contingencies and questionable going concern status, sys-
tematic risk is hypothesized to increase over the period of interest, 
as discussed earlier in this chapter. Therefore, for companies with 
these types of qualification, the following null hypothesis is tested: 
There ~s no increase in systematic risk over the period of 
.time for which a "subject to" opinion is issued for asset 
valuation contingencies or questionable gqing concern 
status. 
The rejection of this null hypothesis would indicate that systematic 
risk has increased over the period of time in question and that there 
is a relationship between the type of opinion studied and systematic 
risk. 
For qualifications issued for litigation contingencies, as dis-
cussed earlier, no increase in systematic risk is expected. Therefore, 
no evidence is expected to be found which will result in the rejection 
of the following null hypothesis: 
There is no increase in the systematic component of risk 
over the period of time for which a "subject to" opinion is 
issued for a litigation contingency. 
A second purpose of the study is to determine empirically whether 
a relationship exists between the "subject to" opinion and total risk. 
For all of the types of qualifications discussed, a relationship is 
theorized to exist. Accordingly, the following null hypothesis is also 
tested for all of the qualification types: 
There is no increase in total risk over the period of time 
for which a "subject to" opinion is issued. 
If this null hypothesis is rejected, it would indicate that a relation-
ship exists between total risk and the "subject to" qualified opinion. 
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A possibility exists that the rejection of one null hypothesis may 
be coupled with the failure to reject the other for a given qualifi-
cation type. In the case where Hl0 or H20 is not rejected but H30 is 
rejected, the indication would be that only the unsystematic portion of 
risk is related to this type of opinion. On the other hand, it is not 
expected that the first null hypothesis be rejected and the other fail 
to be rejected. This would indicate that the unsystematic portion of 
risk decreased over the period in question. Since there is no theoret-
ical support for this occurrence, the indication may be that the 
instrument used to test for a change in systematic risk is more sen-
sitive than those used to test for a change in total risk. 
This study will attempt to find a relationship between the "sub-
ject to" qualified opinion and the risk of a company, both the system-
atic component and total risk, while avoiding the methodological 
problems of the other risk studies. This research will not address 
causality, instead, it will study whether the qualification may "sig-
nal" to the market that a risk shift has occurred during the period 
covered by the audit opinion. This question is of interest as many 
have called for the discontinuance of the "subject to" opinion in the 
past, and previous studies which have examined the relationship between 
the qualification and the market have obtained conflicting results. 
The methodology described in the next chapter was designed to avoid the 
problems which may have contributed t~ those conflicting results. 
CHAPTER IV 
METHODOLOGY 
Introduction 
The purpose of this research is to determine whether the issuance 
of a "subject-to" opinion is related to a change in systematic and 
total risk. Systematic risk is measured by beta, obtained from a 
version of the familiar market model. Total risk is measured by two 
methods: (1) variance and (2) the dispersion of returns, which in-
cludes skewness and kurtosis in addition to variance. 
Experimental companies with "subject to" opinions were selected 
from the NAARS data base and divided into portfolios by type of quali-
fication (i.e. asset valuation, litigation, going concern). In order 
to mitigate the confounding factors discussed in Chapter II, control 
companies which matched the experimental companies as closely as 
possible were selected. The method of selection depended upon the type 
of "subject to" qualified opinion received by the experimental company. 
For experimental companies with asset valuation and litigation qualifi-
cations, the control group selected was made up of companies with 
footnoted contingencies, but with clean opinions. For the going 
concern experimental companies, the control group consisted of compa-
nies with similar financial characteristics, as measured by Ohlson's 
model, again with clean opinions. 
The familiar market model with dummy variables representing group 
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(experimental or control) and period (pre- or post-qualification) was 
used to test for a change in beta. A change in total risk was tested 
using two methods: (1) an F-test for change in the variance of returns 
was applied to both individual company and portfolio data, and (2) 
stochastic dominance, a nonparametric test. 
Data Collection 
Sample Group 
Experimental sample companies were selected from the NAARS data 
base. All of the going concern and loss contingency qualifications 
were selected from the most recent NAARS information availqble, which 
contained annual report information for companies with fiscal years 
ending from July 1, 1983 to December 31, 1987. All of the audit 
reports containing "subject to" opinions in a given year were obtained 
by using the key words "REPRT", to select the auditor's report, and 
"CONTG", to list only those with a contingency qualification. Out of 
the companies located in this step; only those which had the actual 
words "subject to" in the opinion were selected. In addition, the 
number of companies was fur,ther limited as banks and utili ties were 
eliminated from the sample because of their required adherence to 
accounting procedures which are distinctly different from those of the 
other industries and because the impact of regulatory activity may 
influence their market returns. 
These companies were divided into categories based upon the reason 
for qualification. Those companies with audit reports listing more 
than one reason for the qualification were deleted, as these companies 
would not fit into one specific category for testing. A large number 
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of companies with questionable going concern status remained, therefore 
a sample of these companies was selected for use in the study. Due to 
limited data, all of the companies with litigation and asset valuation 
qualifications meeting the previously discussed criteria were used in 
the study. 
Segregation of qualifications by type is a procedure followed in 
many of the previous studies (such as Firth [1978], Ball, Walker and 
Whittred [1979], Davis [1982], and Finnerty and Oliver [1985]) which 
allows the researcher to determine whether the different qualified 
opinions have different relationships with market returns. The divi-
sion is an important one to this study because tqe events causing the 
issuance of "subject to" qualifi<?ations vary widely. Segregation of 
this nature also addresses the point made by Craswell [1985] that audit 
qualifications should be partitioned by type because some types of 
events which result in qualification have a more serious impact on a 
company's business than others. For this study, all qualifications of 
a particular type make up one portfolio, which is used in both the 
change in systematic risk and .the change in total risk tests. 
To reduce confounding information, only companies which received 
clean opinions in the previous year were included in the experimental 
sample. Previous year opinions were obtained from NAARS. If NAARS did 
not contain the previous year's report, microfiche at; Oklahoma State 
University (OSU), the University of Oklahoma (OU) and the University of 
Texas at Austin (UT) were searched. If the report was found to be 
qualified or no report was found from any of the above sources, the 
company was deleted from the sample and, if possible (i.e., for the 
going concern group) another company was selected. 
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The issuance date of each experimental company's audit reports was 
also needed in order to determine the last possible date that the 
market could have heard about the qualification. This information was 
needed so that the second data collection period could begin seven days 
after the report was made public. The Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion (SEC) stamps the date of re~eipt on the front page of the lOK. 
For the purposes of this study, if this date was available on the 
microfiche at OSU, OU, or UT for the companie~ in the sample, it was 
the one used as.the d~te of the report release. However, it was not 
always possible to observe the SEC receipt date on the microfiche. In 
this case, the date used was the one stamped on the front page by the 
microfiche company (Disclosure), the stock exchange, or NASDAQ. By 
reviewing a number of lOK's for which the SEC stamp and one of the 
other stamps were present, it appeared that these other dates were 
generally only one or two days after the SEC receipt date. Therefore, 
the use of the dates from these other stamps appeared to be a reason-
able and conservative estimate of when the information became available 
to the public. 
For the loss contingency qualifications (asset valuation and 
litigation), all of the experimental companies located were used. 
Table II lists the total number located and those which had to be 
deleted from the group. A large number of companies with going concern 
qualifications was available for use in this study. Therefore, a 
sample of fifty companies was selected from those available. The fifty 
companies included in the sample were obtained as shown in Table III. 
For all of the qualification types, Appendix A contains a list of the 
companies included in the portfolio. 
TABLE II 
NUMBER OF COMPANIES IN LOSS CONTINGENCY SAMPLES 
Asset Valuation Litigation 
Total without banks and utilities 
less: those with previous year 
qualifications or for which 
no previous year opinion 
could be found 
less: those for which no control 
matches could be found 
less: 'those deleted for other 
reasons, such as mergers, no 
return data, or contingency 
resolved during test period 
Total number in experimental groups 
TABLE III 
60 
30 
5 
__ 2_ 
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SELECTION OF COMPANIES IN GOING CONCERN SAMPLE 
Total without banks and utilities 
Total selected with random number generator 
less: those with previous year qualifications 
or for which no previous year opinion 
could be found 
less: those for which no control matches could 
be found 
less: those for which no return data could be 
found for the periods of interest 
less: those deleted for other reasons, such as 
no SEC receipt date could be found, or 
contingency was resolved 
Total number in experimental group 
105 
44 
19 
__ 4_ 
38 
134 
56 
5 
18 
__ s_ 
so 
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Control Group 
The method of selecting a control group depended upon the type of 
qualification. The selection was done in order to obtain control 
companies which were as similar to the experimental companies as 
possible, with the exception of the type of opinion received. 
Uncertainty Qualifications. For uncertainty qualifications, the 
selection process involved choosing a control group which was similar 
to the sample not only in size, industry, and year end, but which also 
had uncertainties in the financial statements. This served to more 
effectively isolate the relationship between the risk of the company 
and the qualification, as more company characteristics which may be 
related to risk can be controlled. 
The control group for uncertainty qualifications was selected from 
those companies with uncertainty footnotes but with clean opinions. 
The control group had the same type of uncertainty as the experimental 
group with which it is matched (i.e. asset valuation or litigation) and 
also had a clean opinion for the previous year. Size, industry, and 
year end were also matched as closely as possible. 
For a particular sample observation, this matching was accom-
plished by searching NAARS for the period in which the qualified 
opinion was issued. All companies were listed that had the same 
two-digit SIC industry code as the sample observation and had a foot-
note referencing the same type of uncertainty as stated in the quali-
fied opinion. Litigation footnotes were obtained by searching the 
contingency footnote information in NAARS using the following terms: 
lawsuit, suit, legal, litigation, defendant, sue, claim, complaint, 
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damages and class action. Asset valuation contingencies were generated 
by the use of the following terms: write down, write off, value, 
revalue, valuation, realize, investment, security, bankruptcy, impair 
and reduce. 
Those companies which had year ends within one week of the sample 
company's year end were eligible to be chosen as control companies. In 
addition, due to a data limitation, those companies which had year ends 
three to four months prior to the year end of the sample company were 
also considered as potential control companies. These companies had 
year end dates which were close to those of the experimental companies 
and by excluding those companies which had year end dates one to two 
months prior to the experimental companies, companies which issued 
their annual reports during the forty-day data collection periods (a 
source of confounding information) were not included in the control 
group. The company closest in size, as measured by the amount of 
relative total assets, to the sample observation was chosen as a con-
trol. Relative total assets was .measured by dividing the total assets 
of the potential control company by the total assets of the sample 
company. The control company with the relative total asset measure 
closest to one was chosen as the best match. 
Finally, the prior year financial statements were checked to 
determine that the contingency in question occurred during the current 
year. If this contingency existed on the previous year's financial 
statements, a different company was selected. 
One control company was selected for each experimental company for 
use in all but one of the tests. As discussed in the stochastic 
dominance section of this chapter, five control companies (the primary 
control company used in the other tests and four additional control 
companies, if available) were selected for each experimental company 
for use in the test involving stochastic dominance. The same methods 
discussed above were used to select all of the companies. 
34 
The primary control group consists of the same number of companies 
as does the experimental group: 23 for asset valuation and 38 for 
litigation. The total number of control companies found, additional 
and primary"controls, was 74 for the asset valuation group and 107 for 
litigation. Appendix B contains a listing of the companies which make 
up the primary control group, while Appendix C contains a listing of 
the additional control group companies. 
Going Concern. Going concern qualifications, on the' other hand, 
were matched with companies that had similar financial statement 
characteristics, as well as size, industry, and year end, but did not 
receive qualifications. This method was an improvement over matching 
done without considering the financial condition of the company. The 
result is a control group which is more like the experimental sample in 
all ways, except for the type of opinion issued. 
Matching on financial condition was accomplished by using a method 
developed by Ohlson [1980]. This is similar to Altman's [1968] proce-
dure used by Brown and Levitan [1986] to obtain matches for a sample of 
companies with going concern qualifications. Ohlson's model was chosen 
because its development was based upon firms with levels of financial 
distress which are similar to those firms included in this study. 
Ohlson's method to predict bankruptcy in one or two years, developed by 
codditional logit analysis, contains the variables listed in Table IV. 
A value was generated from the model by inserting a company's financial 
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characteristics into an equation (1) containing the parameter values 
presented in the table below. 
Ohlson's value -.4878(SIZE) + 5.29(TLTA) - .99(WCTA) + 
0.062(CLCA) - 1.9l(OENEG) - 4.62(NITA) - 2.25(FUTL) -
5.2l(INTWO) + 0.212(CHIN) (1) 
Variable 
SIZE 
TLTA 
WCTA 
CLCA 
OENEG 
NITA 
FUTL 
INTWO 
CHIN 
TABLE IV 
OHLSON'S MODEL VARIABLES 
Estimate 
-0.4878 
5.2900 
-0.9900 
0.0620 
-1.9100 
-4.6200 
-2.2500 
-0.5210 
0.2120 
Calculati_on of Variable 
ln(total assets/GNP price-level index) 
Total liabilities/total assets 
Working capital/total assets 
Current liabilities/current assets 
1 if total liabilities > total assets, 
0 otherwise 
Net income/total assets 
Funds from operations/total liabilities 
1 if n~t income was negative for the past 
two years, 0 otherwise 
(NI tNI t-l/(INI ! + INI t-t), where NI t 
is net income for the most recent period 
The control sample was selected in a manner similar to that used 
by Brown and Levitan [1986] and provides an even closer match because 
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Ohlson's procedure, unlike that of Altman, takes into account the size 
of the companies involved. For a particular observation from the 
experimental sample, the value was calculated according to the model. 
COMPUSTAT was used to obtain the information for all of the companies 
with the same two-digit SIC code and same year end as that of the 
experimental company. Ohlson's model was applied to all of these 
potential control companie's. The company with the value closest to 
that of the experimental company was tentatively selected and both the 
current and previous years' audit opinions were checked to ensure that 
. ' 
they were unqualified. If either the current or the prior year's 
opinion was not a clean opinion, the company with the next closest 
model value was chosen. 
In order to check the validity of the results, the same test used 
in Brown and Levitan [1986] was used to compare the values for the'two 
groups to indicate the closeness of the match on financial condition. 
The test used was a paired t-test, applied to the differences between 
Ohlson's model value for each experimental companies and the model 
value for each of the 'matched control companies. The test was run once 
for each portfolio to determine ~hat no significant differences in the 
model values of the experimental and control companies were found for 
the portfolio. The test statisti,c which is distributed as a student's 
t is as follows: 
t= _L 
(Sd /n) 
where d is the mean difference ,between the experimental and 
contro'l model values 
sd is the standard deviation of the differences 
and n is the number of matched pairs in the portfolio 
(2) 
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This test statistic measured whether the values obtained from Ohlson's 
model were significantly different between the experimental and control 
companies. At-value of 0.1427 with fifty degrees of freedom was 
obtained, which gives a p-value of .8871, indicating that no signifi-
cant difference between the model values exists. 
As discussed under loss contingencies, one control company (called 
the primary control) was selected for each experimental company for use 
in all of the tests except for the stochastic dominance test. When 
possible, four more control companies (called additional control 
companies) were ~elected for~this test, resulting in, at most, a total 
of five control companies. For going concern, the primary control 
group contains 50 companies while the additional control group consists 
of another 178 companies. Lists of the companies which make up the 
primary .control group are presented in Appendix B, while the additional 
control group companies are contained in Appendix C. 
Data Collection Periods 
There are two time periods over which the returns for the experi-
mental companies are measured and the tests conducted (Figure 1). 
First, ·the returns were obtained for the forty trading days starting at 
the beginning of the fiscal year. The second time period consisted of 
forty trading days beginning one week after the qualification was made 
public (i.e. received by the SEC). The returns for the control com-
panies were calculated over the same time periods as for the experi-
mental company to which they were matched. 
Beg of 
fiscal yr. 
I Period 11 
Fiscal 
yr. end 
I 
Opinion 
Issuance 
Period 21 
38 
Pre-opinion 
(40 days starting 
at the beginning 
the of the fiscal year) 
Post-opinion 
(40 days starting 
seven days after 
opinion is issued) 
Figure 1. Risk Measurement Periods 
Since annual financial data are not due until three months after 
the fiscal year end, using the first data collection period discussed 
above resulted in the exclusion of annual report release dates and the 
related market react~on from the measurement periods. The second data 
collection period is chosen to begin after the annual report (and the 
opinion) is released for ~he fiscal year of interest because the market 
may not yet be aware of the circumstances resulting in the contingency 
until they are disclosed in the report. 
For the experimental companies,, in order to provide assurance that 
information regarding the contingency was not resolved by the market 
during the second calculation period, the Wall Street Journal Index was 
searched for evidence of stories pertaining to the resolution of the 
events leading to the qualification. In the event that such evidence 
was found, the company in question was removed from the sample and, for 
the going concern group, another was chosen to replace it. 
In the case of control companies, the indices were also searched. 
The Wall Street Journal Index was again reviewed for resolution of the 
loss contingency for asset valuation or litigation matches for the 
period after the financial statements were released, up until the end 
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of the second data collection period. The same review was applied to 
the precarious financial status of the company in the case of going 
concern matches. In addition, for those loss contingency controls with 
year ends three to four months prior to their experimental company, a 
search of the indices was made for the period between their previous 
year's financial statement ,release (without the contingency in the 
footnotes) and the end of the first return collection period. This was 
done to determine that the contingency did not arise prior to, or 
during, the first return collection period. 
Collection of Returns 
In general, returns for the experimental and control sample compa-
nies which were listed on either the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) or 
the American Stock Exchange (AMSE) were obtained from the daily CRSP 
tapes. When the company was not listed on the CRSP tape, for whatever 
reason, the Standard and Poors Corporation NYSE Daily Stock Price 
Record and AMSE Daily Stock Price Record were consulted. If the 
information on the company's stock price, as well as any dividends 
received, was listed for the period in question, the stock returns were 
calculated using the following formula: 
(closing price at day t) - (closing urice at day t-1) + dividends 
closing price at day t-1 (3) 
where the prices are adjusted for any stock dividends or stock splits. 
All of the information needed to calculate the returns for over-the-
counter (OTC) stocks in either sample were obtained from the Standard 
and Poors Corporation OTC Daily Stock Price Record. The average of the 
bid and ask quotes was used when no single quote was provided. The 
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CRSP value-weighted return (VWRETD) which includes all distributions 
was chosen as the market return variable. 
Statistical Tests 
The statistical tests were performed to measure the change in two 
types of risk, systematic and total risk. The first test is a market 
model regression with dummy variables, designed to measure a change in 
beta, a measure of systematic risk. To measure a change in total risk, 
stochastic dominance and the variance change F-test were used. 
' ' Measuring the Change in Systematic Risk 
In order to test the first two hypotheses developed in Chapter 
III, the relationship of "subject to" qualified opinions to a change in 
systematic risk was investigated. Like the other studies concerning 
the relationship between systematic risk and qualified opinions (Alder-
man [1977], Shank, Murdock and Dillard [1982] and Finnerty and Oliver 
[1985]), beta was used as the measure of systematic risk. 
The stability of beta over the two time periods was tested using a 
linear regression equation with dummy variables representing period 
(pre- or post-qualification) and group (experimental or control). This 
is similar to the analysis of covariance procedure commonly referred to 
as the "Chow test" [C~ow, 1960] which was used by Finnerty and Oliver 
[1982] in their test of beta changes. One important advantage of the 
dummy variable method is that the "Chow test" measures any change in 
intercept im addition to the change in beta while dummy variables can 
be used to measure the impact of both parameters separately 
In order to perform this test, the regression equation (4) was 
41 
applied to portfolio level data. One portfolio exists for each type of 
qualified opinion (the method of selecting the companies in these port-
folios was discussed earlier in the chapter). For each company in the 
experimental portfolio, there was one matched company in the control 
portfolio. Portfolio return data were obtained by averaging all of the 
company and market returns for each of the forty days in each period, 
resulting in an equally weighted value per day. The following regres-
sian equation was fit to all of the data for both of the data calcula-
tion periods: 
(4) 
where G=O if the data is from the control portfolio 
G=l if the data is from the experimental portfolio 
P=O if the data is from the first period 
P=l ·if the data is from the second period 
R is the market return on day t 
and Rmt. h return of the portfolio on day t t l.S t e 
The breakdown of this equation into the four possible combinations of 
dummy variable values is as follows: 
Control Portfolio, period 1: (G=O, P=O) 
R =B +B R (5) 
t 0 4 mt 
Control Portfolio, period 2: (G=O, P=l) 
Experimental Portfolio, period 1: (G=l, P=O) 
Experimental Portfolio, period 2: (G=l, P=l) 
(8) 
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If the two portfolios have a significantly different change in beta for 
R over the two estimation periods, an F-test performed on parameter 
mt 
~7 • which measures the difference in change in beta between the experi-
mental and control groups over the two periods, will be found to be 
significant, and Hl0 and H20 will be rejected. 
In summary, in order to test for a shift in systematic risk, beta 
was calculated over two time periods, one at the beginning of the ac-
counting period and one after the opinion is issued. The stability of 
beta over the two time periods was tested using a linear regression 
equation, containing dummy variables for group as well as period. 
Measuring the Change in Total Risk 
The third hypothesis, develop~d in Chapter III, was tested using 
two methods: stochastic dominance and a variance change test utilizing 
an F-statistic. Stochastic- dominance is presented first, followed by a 
discussion of the applicatibn of the variance change test to company 
and portfolio data. 
Stochastic Dominance. Stochastic dominance was one of the methods 
used to measure a change in the total risk of the sample. Stochastic 
dominance (SD) compares the cumulative distributions of two sets of 
returns, taking into account the first four moments of the distribution 
of returns. This method has two advantages over methods using only two 
moments, the mean-variance (M-V) approach, in some cases: (1) when 
both the return and the,risk of one investment are higher (or lower) 
than another, the M-V approach alone cannot determine the efficient 
investment [Porter and Carey, 1974]; and (2) the M-V approach assumes 
normality of returns while SD makes no assumptions regarding the return 
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distribution [Levy and Kroll, 1978]. 
There are three types of stochastic dominance, first-degree (FSD), 
second-degree (SSD) and third-degree, the first two of which relate to 
this study [Levy and Sarnat, 1984]. For all types of stochastic domi-
nance, investment F is preferred to investment G if and only if the 
utility obtained by receiving the returns of F is greater than the 
utility of receiving the returns of G. The only assumption needed for 
FSD is that the first derivative of the investor's utility function is 
positive, or that more return is preferred to less. Then for all 
investors meeting this requirement, regardless of their attitude 
towards risk, F can be said to be preferred to G (or dominates G) if 
F(R)~G(R) for all returns R provided that for at least one value of R, 
F(R)<G(R). An example of this is shown in Figure 2. The investor can 
always be expected to ~elect F over G if there is always a higher 
probability of receiving a smaller return with investment G than with 
F. 
In order to use SSD, an additional assumption must be made. If 
investors are assumed to be risk averse (or equivalently, the second 
derivative of the investors' utility function is assumed to be 
negative), a preference can be determined for F over Gin some cases 
even if their cumulative probability distributions intersect. SSD 
states that the area under the cumulative probability distribution of F 
must be smaller than or equal to the area under the cumulative proba-
bility distribution of G for'all possible values of R, provided that 
for at least one value of R, the area under the distribution of F must 
be absolutely smaller. This can be stated mathematically as follows: 
An example of the dominance of F over G is given in Figure 3. 
cumulative 
probability 
distribution 1.0 
return 
Figure 2. · An Example of First-Degree Stochastic 
Dominance of F Over G 
cumulative 
probability 
distribution 1.0 -------------r-r------------1 
Gl F 
1-----...J 
return 
Figure 3. An Example of Second-Degree Stochastic 
Dominance of F Over G 
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(9) 
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Under FSD, since it is assumed that more return is preferred to 
less and no assumptions are made about risk preferences, the dominant 
investment is determined based only on the amount of return and not on 
the amount of risk involved. The dominant investment has at least as 
high an expected return as the dominated investment. Risk aversion by 
investor~ is assumed under SSD in addition to the assumption that more 
return is preferred to less. This additional assumption is generally 
regarded to be realistic in terms of observed human behavior. As 
stated by Schall and Haley [1983], 
The words 'risk' and 'uncertainty' convey negative feelings to 
most people. In their financial affairs, as in most aspects of 
life, both ind~vid~als and business managers try to avoid risk 
whenever they can, and they minimize risk when it can not be a-
voided. 
When using SSD it is still true that the dominant investment must 
have at least as high an expected return. Unlike FSD, however, the 
opposite does not always hold - that the one with the higher return is 
always dominant. It is true that the investment with the higher return 
can not be dominated by the other investment, however the two can be 
neutral (if the investment with the higher return is more risky). In 
addition, when two investments'have.the same expected return, the one 
with the least risk is the dominant one [Levy and Sarnat, 1984]. 
Because SSD is based upon the assumption that less risk is. pre-
ferred to more, it can be used to measure whether a company has in-
curred a change in total risk relative to that of another company. If 
two companies retain the same relative return over two periods (i.e. 
both increase or decrease by about the same amount), any change in 
dominance between the two companies is due to a change in the riskiness 
of their returns relative to one another. 
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It was expected that since total risk is hypothesized to increase, 
the companies in the experimental sample would more frequently become 
dominated by the companies in the control group over the two periods, 
provided that their expected returns do not increase. Because beta is 
related to return, if there is no comparative change in beta for the 
experimental company over and above any change in the control company, 
then the difference in the retu~ns between the experimental and control 
companies should remain about the same. In this case, a change in the 
proportion of dominated companies to those which are dominant or 
neutral would indicate a change in the total risk. As the total risk 
increases in the experimental sample, the proportion of those experi-
mental sample companies which dominate should decrease and the propor-
tion which are dominated by the control companies should increase. 
In the case where a significant change occurs in a company's beta, 
since returns are based upon beta (the higher the beta, the higher the 
return required), it is likely that the return would also change. If 
the returns of the experimental companies increase relative to that of 
the control companies, it is likely that the experimental companies 
will become less dominated (more will be found to be neutral or domi-
nant) and vice versa. Stochastic dominance may, therefore, not be an 
effective tool to test for a change in the total risk if there is a 
statistically significant increase in beta. Therefore, if the dummy 
variable test results indicate that the experimental companies have 
experienced a change in beta, the stochastic dominance test results may 
be driven by the beta change and may not be reliable as a test of 
change in total risk. If no significant change in beta is found for 
the experimental group over and above any change in the control group, 
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the test for a change in beta using linear regression with dummy vari-
ables (as described in the previous section) applied to individual 
company data provides additional information about the extent of beta 
changes. A small number of experimental companies exhibiting a beta 
change, when matched with their primary control company, would provide 
assurance that there are not a large number of matches in the stochas-
tic dominance test that are affected by beta changes. In addition, an 
indication that these changes occur in both directions (betas increased 
for some of the experimental companies and decreased for others) would 
suggest that the effects are randomized within the sample and do not 
affect the results in a significant way. The experimental companies 
for which a significant change in beta was ~ound (0.05 level), as 
compared to its primary control company, is listed in Appendix E along 
with the direction of the beta change. Chapter V includes a discussion 
of these findings and their implications. 
To apply SSD to this data for the first test period, each experi-
mental company with a given contingency was paired with each of the 
control companies with that same contingency. For each experimental 
company in the sample, up to five control companies were selected, as 
discussed earlier in this chapter. Therefore, for each of the experi-
mental companies, the number of resulting pairs was equal to the number 
of con~rol companies found for that entire portfolio. This matching of 
an experimental firm with each of the control firms in the portfolio, 
which was necessary due to a data limitation, is expected to bias 
against finding significant results. It is expected that more compa-
nies will be neutral to one another in both periods of interest because 
dissimilar companies tend to have different return characteristics, 
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indicating no change in the characteristics of interest for this test. 
Next, the returns for each of the companies were arranged from 
smallest to largest and the cumulative distributions of each of the 
return series were determined. The SSD algorithm (equation 9) was then 
run on each pair. This algorithm determined whether a given experimen-
tal company dominated a given control company. Experimental company 
dominance was found if the area under the experimental company's 
cumulative distribution was smaller than, or equal to, the area under 
the cumulative distribution of the control company for each possible 
return, for at least one return the area must be absolutely smaller. 
Control company' dominance was found if the exact opposite was true -
the area under the control company's cumulative distribution is small-
er. The two compa,nies were found to be neutral if neither of the above 
were found (i.e. the area under the cumulative distribution was found 
to be smaller for the experimental company in some cases and smaller 
for the control company in some cases). The number of times that each 
company in the experimental group dominates, is dominated by, or is 
neutral to the control c.ompany was determined for the first data 
collection period. This procedure was again carried out for the second 
period in the study. The comparison of one experimental company to the 
whole control portfolio distinguishes this test from all of the other 
tests conducted, which only pair one control company with a specific 
experimental company. 
The results obtained over the two periods were compared using a 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov two-sample test. This measure provided a nonpara-
metric test of whether the dominance characteristics (the number of 
times the experimental companies are dominated, dominant, or neutral, 
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as compared to the control companies), changed significantly over the 
two periods. For each portfolio, the test was applied three times to 
the data obtained from the stochastic dominance tests to determine 
whether changes occurred in the following: (1) dominant experimental 
companies; (2) dominated experimental companies; and (3) neutral 
experimental companies. 
To test for a change in the number of dominant companies, the ex-
perimental companies within each of the three portfolios were ranked 
(lowest to highest) by the number of times experimental company domi-
nance occurred. The cumulative distribution functions were calculated 
from the rankings for each of the two periods. For each observation, 
the second period's cumulative distribution value is subtracted from 
the first period's cumulative distribution value at the same point. 
The largest of all of the differences between the cumulative distri-
butions is then compared to the critical value for the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov two-sample test from the appropriate table in order to test 
hypothesis H30 . The results from this test are considered to be 
conservative [Hollander and Wolfe, 1973]. 
Variance Change Test. The variance of the returns was calculated 
over the same time periods as beta. This test was applied to both 
individual company and portfolio data. 
The null hypothesis of no difference between the variances of the 
first and second time periods (H30 ) company was tested using the 
following F-statistic obtained from Steel and Torrie [1980]: 
F variance of the second period returns 
variance of the first period returns (10) 
so 
The variances used in this test were standardized by dividing the vari-
ance of the company's returns by the variance of the market's returns 
over the same time period. This standardization was performed because 
a change in market variance over the two periods should have an impact 
upon the experimental or control company variances. According to 
Anderson, e.t. al., standardization should be used when comparisons of 
different times or populations are being made [Anderson, e.t. al., 
1980]. 
To apply this test to individual company data, the number of 
experimental companies with significant changes in variance was com-
pared to the number of control companies with significant changes using 
a Pearson chi-square test. A significant chi-square test would indi-
cate that the null hypothesis, H30 , would be rejected for the particu-
lar type of qualification being tested. 
In addition to perform~ng this test on individual company data, 
portfolio data were also used. The above F-statistic was applied to 
the company and market returns for each of the three portfolios: asset 
valuation, litigation and'going concern. This was accomplished by sub-
tracting the average control group return for each day in the two data 
calculation periods from the average experimental group return for that 
same day. The F-test was applied to the differences between these two 
amounts. 
In summary, to test for a change in total risk, both the second 
degree stochastic dominance and the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test were 
applied to the data. The F-test for change in variance was conducted 
using both individual company and portfolio level data. The results of 
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these tests are contained in the following chapter with any limitation 
and implication of those results in the final chapter. 
CHAPTER V 
RESULTS 
Introduction 
The relationship of both beta and total risk to the issuance of ,a 
"subject to" qualified opinion was the focus of this study. The 
related hypotheses and the detailed methodology were presented in 
Chapters III and IV, respectively. The tests were for changes in 
systematic risk and for changes in total risk. 
A market model regression equation, containing dummy variables for 
group and data period, was estimated for each of three portfolios to 
determine whether a change in systematic risk occurred in the experi-
mental sample (beyond any change in the control group) over the two 
periods of interest. No si&nificant change in systematic risk was 
observed for any of the three portfolios, asset valuation, litigation 
and going concern. 
Three methods were utilized to test for a change in total risk. 
First, an F-test for change in variance was applied to the portfolio 
level data and a significant increase in total risk was noted for each 
of the portfolios, except for litigation. The same F-test was applied 
to individual company data and the resulting numbers of companies with 
significant changes were tested using a chi-square analysis. For this 
test, only the going concern sample indicated significance. Finally, 
stochastic dominance was applied to the data for each of the opinion 
52 
53 
types, and the changes in the dominance characteristics were compared 
over the two periods using a Kolmogorov-Smirnov two-sample test. A 
significant change in the dominance characteristics was observed for 
only the asset valuation and going concern samples. Taken as a whole, 
the total risk tests strongly indicate a change for the going concern 
sample, and suggest that the, asset valuation s'ample may have also expe-
rienced such a change. No shift was noted for the litigation group. 
The presentation of these results begins with the beta shift test 
results, presented by type of qualification. Next, the tests for a 
change in total risk are presented with the discussion of the F-tests 
preceding that of stochastic dominance. The presentation is again 
structured by type of qualification. 
Beta Change Tests 
In order to test for a shift in beta, a dummy variable regression 
was estimated for the portfolio-level data, as discussed in Chapter 
IV. This test was run three,times, once for each of the portfolios: 
asset valuation, litigation and going ~oncern. As discussed previous-
ly, each portfolio'contains those companies which incurred a certain 
type of contingency. 
Asset Valuation 
As discussed in Chapter III, one may expect a positive relation-
ship between the issuance of a "subject to" opinion for asset valuation 
and an increase in the beta of a stock. The market model regression, 
equation (4), with dummy variables for group (i.e. experimental and 
control) and for period (pre- and post-qualification), allowed the 
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regression parameters to vary over groups and periods in order to test 
for such a relationship. The parameter of interest is B7 , the last one 
listed in Table V, G*P*MKT, which measures the difference in the beta 
change between the experimental and control groups. As can be seen 
from the table, the parameter estimate is of the same sign (positive) 
as hypothesized. However, the probability value for ltl ~ 0.44, occur-
ring by chance is 0.6580, indicating that the increase in beta for the 
experimental group is not significant at the desired 0.05 level of sig-
nificance. It is also evident from the table that the standard error 
of the estimate for this last parameter is the largest of the eight, 
indicating more uncertainty regarding the estimation of this parameter 
than the others. 
The division of these parameter estimates into the four possible 
regression equations, equations (5) through (8), is presented in Table 
VI. Slope and intercept values, obtained when the appropriate dummy 
variable values are inserted into the regression equation, are pre-
sented along with the formulas for obtaining those values. It is 
apparent that although the beta for the experimental sample decreased 
over the periods, it decreased less than did the control group for that 
same period of time. 
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TABLE V 
PARAMETER ESTIMATES AND SIGNIFICANCE TESTS 
ASSET VALUATION SAMPLE 
PARAMETER NAME ESTIMATE T FOR HO: PR > ITI STD ERROR OF 
OF COEFFICIENT=O EST.IMATE 
COEFFICIENT 
INTERCEPT 
.&o 0.00053250 0.36 0.7204 0.00148519 
G 
p 
G*P 
MKT 
G*MKT 
P*MKT 
G*P*MKT 
MODEL 
.&1 0.00129452 0.62 0.5386 0.00210038 
.&2 -0.00030680 -0.14 0.8852 0.00212203 
.&3 -0.00057559 -0.19 0.8482 0.00300101 
.&4 0.64550577 1. 33 0.1870 0.48698665 
.&5 0.59609551 0.87 0.3881 0.68870313 
.&6 -0.88119856 -0.91 0.3633 0.96649647 
.&7 0.60626578 0.44 0.6580 1.36683242 
DF=152 R-SQUARE 0.069867 
TABLE VI 
INTERCEPT AND SLOPE PARAMETERS 
ASSET VALUATION SAMPLE 
SAMPLE (G) 
CONTROL 
G=O 
CONTROL 
G=O 
EXPERIMENTAL 
G=1 
EXPERIMENTAL 
G=1 
PERIOD (P) INTERCEPT 
FIRST 0.00053250 
P=O .&0 
SECOND 
P=1 
FIRST 
P=O 
SECOND 
P=1 
0.00022570 
.&0+.&2 
0.00094463 
Bo+B1+.&2+.&3 
SLOPE 
0.64550577 
.&4 
-0.23569279 
.&4+.&6 
0.96666850 
E.4+B5+E.6+B7 
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Liti~ation 
Unlike the case for the asset valuation companies, no change in 
beta was hypothesized to occur when a litigation contingency resulting 
in qualification arises. Chapter III presented the argument that a 
litigation contingency is company specific because its result is solely 
based upon information and events surrounding the company, the court, 
and the other party to the suit. The outcome of the suit, therefore, 
should not be affected by those things which affect the market as a 
whole, resulting in no determinable relationship between the issuance 
of such a qualification and a change in beta. 
Table VII below displays the p~rameter estimates from the dummy 
variable regression test for a change in beta using the litigation con-
tingency portfolio data. The parameter of interest is the last one 
listed in table, G*P*MKT, which has at-value of -0.78 and aPR> ITI 
of 0.4391. As was hypothesized, this t-value is not significant and no 
statistically significant change in beta was noted from these test re-
sults. 
Table VIII breaks down the information given in Table VII into the 
intercept and slope estimates for each of the four possible combina-
tions of dummy variable values. It can be noted that the slope value 
for the second period of the experimental group is.below zero, far from 
the average beta value often seen in portfolio data. This may be due 
to the large standard error of each of E6 and E7 (2.08435459 and 
2.9478115 respectively, from Table VII) which makes up part of this 
slope coordinate. The large standard error suggests that the data do 
not provide an accurate estimate of this parameter. 
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TABLE VII 
PARAMETER ESTIMATES AND SIGNIFICANCE TESTS 
LITIGATION SAMPLE 
PARAMETER NAME ESTIMATE T FOR HO: PR > ITI STD ERROR OF 
OF COEFFICIENT=O ESTIMATE 
COEFFICIENT 
INTERCEPT F..o 0. 00072713 0.26 0.7975 0.00282914 
G 
p 
G*P 
MKT 
G*MKT 
P*MKT 
G*P*MKT 
MODEL 
&1 
1?,2 
g 3 
&4 
1?.5 
&6 
&7 
SAMPLE (G) 
CONTROL 
G=O 
CONTROL 
G=O 
2.13416E-05 0.01 0.9958 0.00400101 
-1.51594E-05 -0.00 0.9970 0.00399522 
0.00589282 1.04 0.2986 0.00565009 
0.85708235 0.93 0.3522 0.91841226 
0.76097353 0.59 0.5588 1.29883116 
-0.27662081 -0.13 0.8946 2.08425459 
-2.28668673 -0.78 0.4391 2.94758115 
DF=152 R-SQUARE 0.040971 
TABLE VIII 
INTERCEPT AND SLOPE PARAMETERS 
LITIGATION SAMPLE 
PERIOD (P) INTERCEPT 
FIRST 0.00072713 
P~o &0 
SECOND 
P=1 
SLOPE 
0.85708235 
1?,4 
------------------------------------------------ -,---------
EXPERIMENTAL 
G=1 
EXPERIMENTAL 
G=1 
FIRST 
P=O 
SECOND 
P=1 
0.00662613 
&0+1?.1+&2+1?.3 
-.94525166 
1?.4+&5+1?.6+1?.7 
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To test for the possible influence of outliers on these results, 
the same regression was applied to individual company data (run on each 
experimental company and its matched control). This test only indi-
cated two companies with significant &7 values, both of which showed 
significant increases in beta for the experimental company as compared 
to the control company. Therefore, neither of these companies have 
beta values which could have contributed to the negative slope value. 
An additional analysis was performed on the data to determine 
whether any of the companies in the litigation sample had extremely 
large variances in their return data which could cause the unusual pa-
rameter value and large parameter variance. To locate companies with 
large variances, the F-test for a change in variance was applied to 
individual company dat~ within the litigation sample. This test is 
also used elsewhere in the study. It was described in Chapter IV and 
is discussed later in this chapter along with the other instruments 
used to test for a shift in total risk. The results of the test, 
contained in Appendix D, indicate:that for one experimental company, 
Excel Energy, the F-value was 671.7345, while the next highest F was 
under 20. 
Based upon these results, Excel Energy and its primary match, 
Cibola Energy were removed from the sample and the dummy variable re-
gression was rerun. The new regression parameters are stated in Table 
IX, and the new intercept and slope coordinates are presented in Table 
X. As shown in Table IX, while &7 is still negative, suggesting that 
the beta of the experimental portfolio decreased more than did the con-
trol group, the t-value is not significant at the 0.05 level. The 
slope coordinates seem more reasonable after the removal of the outlier 
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with the slope of the experimental portfolio during the second equal to 
0.38692238. Therefore, even with the removal of the outlier, no 
significant results were noted for this portfolio, as was hypothesized 
in Chapter III. 
TABLE IX 
PARAMETER ESTIMATES AND SIGNIFICANCE TESTS 
LITIGATION SAMPLE WITHOUT OUTLIER 
PARAMETER NAME ESTIMATE T FOR HO: PR > ITI STD ERROR OF 
OF COEFFICIENT=O ESTIMATE 
COEFFICIENT 
INTERCEPT Eo 0.00098095 0,73 0.4661 0.00000055 
G E1 -0.00018528 -0.10 0.9224 0.00021193 
p E2 -0.00021973 -0'.12 0.9075 0.00188758 
G*P E3 -0.00123846 -0.46 0.6434 0.00266944 
MKT E4 0.95227180 2.08 0.0391 0.46766244 
G*MKT E5 0.80074914 1.24 0.2179 0.64723249 
P*MKT E6 -0.50137589 -0.53 0.5995 0.95268280 
G*P*MKT E7 -0.86472267 -0.64 0.5220 1.34729697 
MODEL DF=152 R-SQUARE 13.7005 
SAMPLE (G) 
CONTROL 
G=O 
CONTROL 
G=O 
TABLE X 
INTERCEPT AND SLOPE PARAMETERS 
LITIGATION SAMPLE W/0 OUTLIER 
PERIOD (P) 
FIRST 
P=O 
SECOND 
P=l 
INTERCEPT 
0.00098095 
E.o 
- 0.00076122 
&o+&2 
SLOPE 
0.95227180 
&4 
---------------------------------------------~------------
EXPERIMENTAL 
G=l 
EXPERIMENTAL 
G=l 
Going Concern 
FIRST 
P=O 
SECOND 
P=l 
-0.00066252 
&o-r&l+&2+&3 
0.38692238 
&4+&5+&6+&7 
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Beta for a questionable going concern with a "subject to" qualifi-
cation was hypothesized to increase in Chapter III because it was as-
sumed that the financially unstable company would be more susceptible 
to swings in the general economy, which would also affect the market in 
general. However, the results of this test, as presented in Table XI, 
do not indicate that this occurred. 
The last parameter estimate listed in the table, again the pararne-
ter of interest, is not significant (t-value of -0.37) as the probabil-
ity of ,a larger value occurring by chance is 0.7148. However, the sign 
is opposite of that expected, indicating a decrease in beta over the 
two periods. 
A decrease in slope, or beta, is noted in Table XII, for both the 
control and experimental groups; however, a larger decrease is evident 
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for the experimental sample. The slope values, as listed in the table, 
are close to the expected value of one for all but the second period 
experimental group. This slope is close to zero, indicating that the 
movement of the portfolio's returns are mostly unrelated to that of the 
market. Whjle the standard error of &7 is again the largest of all of 
the parameter estimates, it is only about half of what the standard 
error was for the litigation portfolio and not much larger than the 
standard error of &6 . A possible explanation for this result is that 
the companies selected for testing were doing so poorly that they were 
experiencing mostly negative returns,' no matter what the market was 
incurring. For companies in extremely severe financial trouble, even 
an upturn in the market may not translate into positive returns. 
TABLE XI 
PARAMETER ESTIMATES AND SIGNIFICANCE TESTS 
GOING CONCERN SAMPLE 
PARAMETER NAME ESTIMATE T FOR HO: PR > ITI STD ERROR OF 
OF COEFFICIENT=O ESTIMATE 
COEFFICIENT 
INTERCEPT &0 0.00630342 5.05 0.0001 0.00124734 
G &1 0.00307354 1. 74 0.0835 0.00176400 
p &2 0.00083690 0.48 0.6299 0.00173346 
G*P &3 0.00357112 1.46 0.1473 0.00245148 
MKT &4 0.97637895 2.09 0.0387 0.46822958 
G*MKT &5 -0.22073761 -0.33 0.7393 0.66217662 
P*MKT &6 -0.21416310 -0.26 0.7960 0.82694405 
G*P*MKT &7 -0.42816546 -0.37 0.7148 1.16947550 
MODEL DF=l52 R-SQUARE 0.174950 
SAMPLE (G) 
CONTROL 
G=O 
TABLE XII 
INTERCEPT AND SLOPE PARAMETERS 
GOING CONCERN SAMPLE 
PERIOD (P) 
FIRST 
P=O 
INTERCEPT 
> 0. 00630342 
E.o 
SLOPE 
0.97637895 
E.4 
- - - - - ,- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - -
CONTROL 
G=O 
EXPERIMENTAL 
G=l 
EXPERIMENTAL 
G=l 
SECOND 
P=l 
FIRST 
P=O 
SECOND 
P=l 
Summary of Systematic Risk Change Test 
0.00714032 
E.o+E.2 
0.01378498 
E.o+E.l+E.2+E.3 
0.11331278 
E.4+E.s+E.6+E.7 
None of the portfolios tested indicated a significant change in 
systematic risk, or beta. For the asset valuation contingency and 
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questionable going concern status portfolios, it was exp~cted that this 
test would show an increase in beta over the period of interest. While 
an increase was noted for the asset valuation sample, the amount was 
not significant. The going concern portfolio, on the other hand, 
indicated an unexpected decrease in beta over the period. In both 
cases, the insignificant results led to the failure to reject Hl0 , 
which stated that there was no increase in beta over the period of 
interest. 
Litigation contingency companies were expected to show no increase 
in beta because the events surrounding the contingency were hypothe-
sized to be company specific. The test results indicated no signifi-
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cant increase (or decrease) in beta over the two data calculation 
periods. Therefore, H20 cannot be rejected for the litigation portfo-
lios. 
Total Risk Change Tests 
In Chapter III, the hypothesized relationship between total risk 
and all three, types of "subject to" qualifications was discussed. It 
was theorized that an increase in total risk would occur over the 
period for which such a qualification is received. Three different 
methods were used to test for such a change in total risk. The first 
two both utilized an F-statistic, but were applied to different levels 
of data - the first to portfolio data and the second to individual 
company data. , A chi-square analysis was used to test the individual 
company results for significance. Stochastic dominance, a nonpara-
metric procedure, was tpen performed on all of the companies, within 
each portfolio. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov two-sample test, also nonpara-
metric, was used to test for a change in the dominance characteristics 
obtained from the stochastic dominance procedure. 
Variance Change Test 
The variance ch~nge test, as described in Chapter IV, is performed 
by dividing the variance of the portfolio data for the second data col-
lection period by the variance for,the first data collection period. 
In order to mitigate any effects caused by changes in the market 
variance over these periods, the variances were standardized by divid-
ing each by the market variance for that period. The value resulting 
from the division is an F-statistic which is compared to the tables 
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[Steel and Torrie, 1980] for significance. In this case, a one-sided 
test was used because the second period variance was hypothesized to be 
higher than the first. 
Portfolio Level Application. To apply this test to the portfolio 
data, the average return for the control group for a given day was sub-
tracted from the average return for the corresponding experimental 
group fo'r that same day. This created a set of forty differences for 
each of the two data collection periods. The variance of these differ-
ences (Vard) was then computed for each period and the F-statistic 
calculated. 
For each of the three qualification types, the variance of the 
difference between_ the ,experimental and, control companies is presented 
in Table XIII, as well as the market variance for each of the periods. 
A standardized vari.ance is calculated by dividing the sample variance 
by the market variance and the, F-value is calculated by dividing the 
standardized variance for the first period by that for the second 
period. 
As shown'in the table, the F-value for the asset valuation portfo-
lio is 3.4688. This F-value for forty degrees of freedom gives a p-
value of 0.001. This result indicates that a significant increase in 
variance was found for the experimental companies over and above any 
change in the control companies for the asset valuation group. 
The F-value for the going concern portfolio, 6.5816. The related 
p-value for forty degrees of freedom is 0.001 which indicates that a 
significant increase in total variance occurred for the experimental 
companies beyond the increase in the control companies for the going 
concern companies. 
TABLE XIII 
F-TEST FOR CHANGE IN VARIANCE (VARd)- PORTFOLIO LEVEL DATA 
ALL QUALIFICATION TYPES 
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PORTFOLIO PERIOD SAMPLE VAR MARKET VAR F P-value 
ASSET VALUATION 1 
2 
0.000156716 
0.000184954 
0.00000899667 
0.00000306132 3.4688 0.001 
---------------------------------~-------------------------------------
LITIGATION * 
GOING CONCERN 
1 
2 
1 
2 
0.000150825 
(0.000158693) 
0.000063861 
(O. 'ooo846851) 
0.000038652 
0.000120043 
0.00000712664 ' 
(0.00000800796) 
0.00000213809 
(0.00000192952) 
0.00000483640 
0.00000228Z25 
1.411 
(22.142) 
6.5816 
0.135 
(0.001) 
0.001 
* The results for the tests conducted on the litigation group with the 
outlier included are presented in parentheses below the results for the 
sample with the outlier excluded. 
There are two sets of information included in Table XIII con-
cerning the litigation portfolio: The results presented in parentheses 
are those of the test ru~ on ,the entire group of companies in the 
sample. As one can note from the table, the F-value for this data is 
quite large. Due to the information regarding the presence of an 
outlier gained during the beta shift test, the F-test was also run on 
the portfolio data with the outlier excluded. This data is presented 
as the primary results in the table. With the outlier deleted, the 
F-value is a more reasonable 1.411 for which the p-value is 0.135. The 
result of the F-test on the litigation portfolio data indicates no 
significant change in variance, or total risk. As is discussed at the 
end of this chapter, this result is more in line with the results 
obtained from the total risk change tests conducted on individual 
company data. 
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Individual Company Application. The same F-test was applied to 
individual company data within each of the three portfolios. This 
test, when applied to experimental and control samples, indicated which 
companies had either: (1) a larger variance during the first data 
collection period, (2) a larger variance during the second period, or 
(3) no significant change in variance over the periods. Appendix D 
contains a listing of the F-test results by individual company (all 
have forty degrees of freedom for both the numerator and the denomina-
tor) and the frequencies calculated from these results are contained in 
Table XIV. A chi-square analysis was utilized in order to compare the 
numbers obtained for the experimental'companies with the numbers 
obtained for the control companies within the same portfolio. 
The frequencies for the asset valuation portfolio are portrayed in 
the top por~ion of Table XIV. For the experimental and control groups, 
the same number of companies shows a significantly larger variance in 
the first period. However, the results for the second period show al-
most twice as many experimental companies with a larger variance. 
These results indicate a shift in total risk in the direction hypoth-
esized, as the experimental group has more companies with a significant 
increase in risk than does the control group. 
However, as Table XV indicates, the difference in the variance 
changes between these two groups is not significant. A chi-square sta-
tistic of 2.941, which has an associated probability of 0.230, was 
calculated from the frequencies in Table XIV for the asset valuation 
portfolio. These results do not indicate significance at the desired 
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0.05 level. 
The center section of Table XIV contains the variance change num-
bers for the litigation group. As indicated, the control group has 
four more companies with larger first period variances, while the 
experimental group has six more companies with larger second period 
variances. As theorized, these results again indicate that more of the 
experimental companies have experienced risk increases. 
As was the case with the asset valuation portfolio, the chi-square 
statistic applied to the litigation group does not indicate signifi-
cance. The numbers in Table XV show a chi-square of 2.489 (probability 
of 0.288), which is less than needed to indicate significance at the 
0.05 level desired for this test. 
QUALIFICATION 
TYPE 
ASSET 
VALUATION 
LITIGATION 
GOING 
CONCERN 
TABLE XIV 
FREQUENCY OF SIGNIFICANT VARIANCE CHANGES 
ALL QUALIFICATION TYPES 
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FREQUENCY AND PERCENT 
GROUP 
CONTROL 
EXPERIMENTAL 
CONTROL 
EXPERIMENTAL 
CONTROL 
EXPERIMENTAL 
PERIOD 1 
LARGER 
6 
26.09% 
6 
26.09% 
13 
34.21% 
9 
23.68% 
15 
30.00% 
3 
6.00% 
NO 
CHANGE 
11 
47.83% 
6 
26.09% 
17 
44.74% 
15 
39.47% 
22 
44.00% 
20 
40.00% 
PERIOD 2 
LARGER 
6 
26.09% 
11 
47.83% 
8 
21. OS% 
14 
36.84% 
13 
26.00% 
27 
54.00% 
TABLE XV 
CHI-SQUARE STATISTIC FOR VARIANCE CHANGE TEST 
ALL QUALIFICATION TYPES 
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PORTFOLIO TYPE DF VALUE PROBABILITY 
ASSET VALUATION 2 2.941 0.230 
LITIGAT.ION 2 2.489 0.288 
GOING CONCERN 2 12.995 0.002 
Data on the application of the test to those companies with ques-
tionable going concern status are located at the bottom of Table XIV. 
The frequencies in the table - the control group with twelve more com-
panies with larger first, period variances and the experimental group 
with fourteen more companies with larger second period variances - show 
movement in the same direction as did the previously discussed two 
portfolios. 
The statistical analysis of these frequencies obtained for the 
going concern portfolio, located in Table XV,, indicates a statistic of 
12.995. In this case, the chi-square value is significant at the 0.002 
level. 
An F-test for a change in variance was applied to each of the com-
,panies within the three qualification types. For the asset valuation 
and litigation portfolios, the change in variance was found to occur in 
the direction hypothesized, however, the results were not significant 
at the desired level. The questionable going concern companies, on the 
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other hand, were found to have an increase in variance which was signi-
ficant at the 0.002 level. 
For the going concern companies, the application of the variance 
change test to both the portfolio and individual company data indicates 
a significant shift in variance over the two periods. The results for 
the asset valuation companies differed between the applications, the 
portfolio test indicated significance while the individual company test 
did not. Neither of the tests was significant at the 0.05 level when 
applied to the"litigation companies. 
Stochastic Dominance 
Stochastic domi~ance, a nonparametric procedure, was applied to 
all of the experimental companies and the dominance characteristics 
were determined. As discussed in the previous chapter, stochastic dom-
inance is not an effective tool to test for a change in the total risk 
of a group of companies if one of the groups experiences statistically 
significant increases in beta as compared to the other. The dummy var-
iable regression (equation 4) results from the systematic risk change 
test indicated that the experimental companies did not experience a 
change in beta over and above the control companies for any of the 
three qualification types. To provide additional information, this 
equation was also applied to individual company data. These results, 
which are presented in Appendix E provide additional information about 
the extent of beta changes. Only a small number of experimental compa-
nies were found to exhibit a beta change, when matched with their pri-
mary control company (i.e., one for asset valuation, two for litigation 
and six for going concern). These results provide assurance that a 
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large number of matches in the stochastic dominance test are not af-
fected by changes in systematic risk. In addition, as indicated ~n 
Appendix E, these changes occur in both directions (betas increased for 
some of the experimental companies and decreased for others) which 
would suggest that the effects are randomized within the sample and 
should not affect the results in a significant way. 
Each of the experimental companies, within a qualification type, 
was paired with each of the control companies in that same portfolio. 
As discussed earlier, the stochastic dominance test is distinguished 
from all of the other tests carried out in this study in that each of 
the experimental companies is matched with all of the controls, not 
just with one co~trol company. For example, as stated at the beginning 
of this chapter, a total of 74 asset valuation control companies was 
obtained, stochastic dominance was run 74 times for each of the 23 
experimental companies. 
The results obtained from running stochastic dominance, called 
dominance characteristics, consist of the number of times the experi-
mental company dominated the control companies, the number of times the 
experimental company was domi~ated by the controls, and the number of 
times neither dominated (neutral results). These dominance character-
isti~s were obtained for both the first and the second data collection 
periods for each of the applicable experimental companies within the 
qualification type. The dominance characteristics for the three 
portfolios are listed in Appendix F. As hypothesized in Chapter IV, if 
the experimental companies increase in risk over the two periods, the 
experimental companies are expected to be dominant over the controls 
less often (dominated by the controls more often) during the second 
period than the first. It is not possible to make a determination 
about the direction of change in the number of neutral companies. 
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A statistical comparison between the results for the two periods 
was obtained using a Kolmogorov-Smirnov two-sample test, also nonpara-
metric. This test was run three times for each qualification type, to 
compare the following results for the first period to those for the 
second period: (1) the number of experimental companies which domi-
nated the controls; (2) the number of controls which dominated the 
experimental; and (3) the number of experimental and control companies 
which were neutral. The results of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test are 
presented in Table XVI. 
For the asset valuation group, the number of experimental com-
panies which dominated the controls changed significantly over the two 
periods, according to the D-value in Table XVI. This suggests that 
from the first period to the second,period the risk increased for a 
significantly larger number of companies in the experimental group than 
for the control group, as was hypothesized (Hl0). The numbers of 
neutral companies and those for which the control dominated did not 
change significantly over this period of time. However, the dominance 
characteristics indicated that the number of times the control company 
dominated the experimental company increased over the two periods, as 
theorized. 
TABLE XVI 
D VALUE FOR KOLMOGOROV-SMIRNOV TWO SAMPLE TEST 
ALL QUALIFICATION TYPES 
PORTFOLIO DF 
TYPE 
ASSET 
VALUATION 22 
SIGN. 
.3478 
DOMINANCE 
CHARACTERISTIC 
EXPERIMENTAL DOMINATES, 
CONTROL DOMINATES 
NEUTRAL 
FREQ 
PRE POST 
416 256 
333 467 
953 979 
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D VALUE 
0.347826 
0.217391 
0.173913 
----------------------------------------------------------------------
LITIGATION 36 
GOING 
CONCERN 44 
.2631 
.2447 
EXPERIMENTAL DOMINATES 
CONTROL DOMINATES 
NEUTRAL 
EXPERIMENTAL DOMINATES 
CONTROL DOMINATES 
NEUTRAL 
668 605 
1057 1453 
2341 2008 
3883 3040 
2201 3409 
' 5316 4951 
0.184211 
0.236842 
0.236842 
0.300000 
0.220000 
0.180000 
The results for the litigation contingency companies are listed in 
Table XVI. They do not indicate that the dominance characteristics 
have significantly changed at the 0.05 level. However, the movement in 
the number of dominant and dominated experimental companies was in the 
direction predicted. 
Finally, for the questionable going concern companies, the D-value 
for the number of times the experimental company dominates the control 
is 0.3 which is greater than 0.2447, the threshold for significance at 
the 0.05 level. Therefore, a significant decrease in number of experi-
mental companies which dominate the controls is found for the going 
concern group. Neither the number of dominant control companies nor 
the number of neutral companies is significant for the questionable 
going concern group. Therefore, the overall results of the application 
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of stochastic dominance to the samples indicate evidence that an 
increase in total risk occurred for the asset valuation and going 
concern samples only. No significant change was found for the litiga-
tion group. 
Summary of Total Risk Change Tests 
Two tests were applied to the data in order to test for a shift in 
total risk. One of these tests, the F-test for a change in variance, 
was applied to both portfolio and individual company data. The other 
procedure, stochastic dominance, was performed by determining the domi-
nance characteristics of each experimental company as compared to each 
of the control companies in its group. 
For the asset valuation companies, the results suggest that a 
shift in total risk may have occurred and therefore, the null hypo-
thesis of no change, H30 , ~s rej ec.ted. Both the F- test applied to 
portfolio data and the chi-square analysis applied to the dominance 
characteristics indicated significance. The only test which did not 
have significant results was the F-test applied to individual company 
data, which achieved a probability of 0.230. Therefore, while the 
results for the asset valuation group are not conclusive, it seems that 
a total risk shift may have taken place for that category of companies. 
None of the tests on the litigation companies was found to be sig-
nificant after the outlier company and its related control were removed 
from the sample. Due to these results, the null hypothesis of no shift 
in total risk, H30 , cannot be rejected for the litigation group. 
The strongest indication of a change in total risk occurred for 
the going concern sample. All of the tests performed were found to 
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have significant results when applied to the going concern portfolio. 
, Therefore, the null hypothesis of no total risk change is rejected for 
this group of companies. 
Summary 
The results for the total risk change tests, when taken together 
with the results for the beta shift test, indicate whether the portfo-
lios experienced changes in unsystematic risk, as well as shifts in 
total risk and beta. A shift in total risk, coupled with no change in 
beta, indicates that only the unsystematic portion of risk changed. 
Two of the total risk change tests were found to have significant 
results for the asset valuation qualification type, while no signifi-
cant results were obtained in the dummy variable regression test. This 
indicates that the only type of risk that may have experienced change 
over the period of the study was unsystematic risk. 
On the other hand, none of the tests conducted on the litigation 
contingency companies was found to have results which were significant 
at the ·o.os level. The indication from these tests is that neither the 
systematic nor the unsystematic portion of risk changed during the 
period of interest. 
Finally, the results of the tests on those companies with ques-
tionable going concern status suggested that a total risk shift oc-
curred. All of the t.otal risk tests were found to have significant 
results. This change in total "risk, coupled with no findings at the 
desired level of significance for the beta shift test, suggests that 
only a change in the unsystematic portion of risk was experienced by 
this group of companies. 
CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
Overview 
The purpose of this study was to determine whether a relationship 
exists between the is,suance of a "subject to" qualified opinion and a 
shift in the risk of a company. If a relationship of this nature was 
found, it may suggest that the "subject to" opinion does have a purpose 
in financial reporting, the opinion may "signal to the market" that a 
risk shift has occurred. Since both systematic and total risk are im-
portant to the auditors' duties, both were studied. 
Companies were selected and stock market return data were studied 
in order to address this question. The experimental group consisted of 
those companies which received qualified opinions and were divided into 
portfolios according to the reason for qualification. The control com-
panies were selected differently depending upon the type of qualifica-
tion its match had received. This was done in order to minimize the 
differences between the experimental company and its control. Returns 
were observed over two periods, forty days at the beginning of the fis-
cal year and forty days after the fiscal year end, when the opinion was 
made public. 
To test for a change in the systematic portion of risk, a market 
model regression equation was applied to the portfolio data. This 
equation contained dummy variables representing the period of data 
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collection (pre- and post-qualification) and the sample, experimental 
or control. It was designed so that one of the parameters in the 
regression equation measured the difference in the change in beta 
between the experimental and control companies. 
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Next, an F-statistic, which indicated shifts in variance, was used 
to test for total risk changes. This test was applied first to portfo-
lio level data. The change in portfolio variance was measured by sub-
tracting the returns for the control group from the returns from the 
experimental sample and testing the variance of these differences. 
Individual company data, within each type of qualification was also 
used in this test. The results obtained for the companies were com-
pared using a chi-square analysis. 
Stochastic dominance was the last procedure carried out on the 
data. The dominance characteristics of each company were obtained by 
applying this procedure to the individual company data. A Kolmogorov-
Smirnov two sample test was then used to determine whether there was a 
change in the dominance characteristics over the two data periods. 
All of the total risk change tests indicated that a significant 
risk shift occurred for those companies which received qualifications 
for questionable going concern status. Two of the three tests were 
also significant for the asset valuation portfolio, suggesting that a 
shift in total risk may have occurred for this group. No significant 
results were obtained for the litigation portfolio from the total risk 
tests. 
No change in beta was observed for any of the three qualification 
types. These results indicate that the total risk changes noted for 
the asset valuation and going concern group were caused by changes in 
the unsystematic portion of total risk. 
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For the asset valuation and going concern companies, these results 
indicate that the auditors' opinions act as a "red flag" to warn inves-
tors that ~he company has become more risky. Since only the unsyste-
matic portion of risk was found to have changed, this signal would be 
more useful for those investors with undiversified portfolios. Those 
holding diversified portfolios w~uld be able to filter out this portion 
of risk and would not be affected by the change. 
Three previous studies have addressed the relationship between the 
issuance of a "subject to" qualified opinion and a shift in risk, 
Alderman [1977], Shank, Murdock and Dillard [1982] and Finnerty and 
Oliver [1985]. Two of the studies, Shank, Murdock and Dillard as well 
as Finnerty and Oliver, found some evidence of an increase in systemat-
ic risk. Alderman inve~tigated the relationship with both systematic 
and total risk and found no significant change in either type. 
The results of this present study, which indicated a change in 
total risk for the going concern and asset valuation groups, are there-
fore different than those of the previously conducted research. Howev-
er, due to the methodological improvements contained in the present 
study, the differing results are not unreasonable. 
This study found no suppor~ for the continuance of a special opin-
ion in the case of litigation. The issuance of a qualification re-
quires the expenditure of resources by both the auditor and the company 
receiving the opinion. If the opinion is not found to serve a purpose 
in the case of litigation, it should be discontinued. 
79 
Although SAS 58 ended the use of the words "subject-to" in audit 
opinions issued for those companies with this type of contingency, a 
signal to the financial statement user remains through the use of dif-
ferent wording in the report addressing the contingency. The present 
study did not indicate support for the inclusion of such a "red flag" 
in the audit report. 
This research provided support for the continuance of an opinion 
containing a "red flag" for asset valuation contingencies and question-
able going concern status and support for the discontinuance in the 
case of litigation contingencies. 
Departures From Prior Research 
Unlike some of the earlier tests conducted in the area, this study 
intentionally measures the effect of the aggregate signal (that caused 
by both the opinion and any other events) on the market. It is neces-
sary to measure the aggregate signal because it has been shown that the 
market effect of the opinion or the events causing it may be impossible 
to segregate. Therefore, this study cannot make a statement of caus-
ality, only the presence of a relationship can be determined. 
In addition, this study looks for a change in the risk of a 
company over a much longer time frame than some of the earlier stud-
ies. This overcomes some of the problems discussed by Craswell 
[1985]. The methods used in the study, linear regression with dummy 
variables and stochastic dominance, as well as the test for a change in 
the variance, are effective to use over a long event period. 
One other important improvement over most of the previous research 
in this area was the use of a control group which more closely resem-
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bles the experimental sample. This improvement was achieved by select-
ing control companies which themselves have either loss contingencies 
of the same type as the experimental company (to match with loss 
contingency qualification companies) or which have similar financial 
characteristics (to match with the questionable going concern status 
companies) . 
Limitations 
Some limitations are inherent in this study. It is possible that 
even if a significant risk shift is discovered in the returns of the 
companies receiving "subject to" opinions, the shift is caused by 
events unrelated to those which resulted in the issuance of a qualified 
opinion. However, even if the significant shift is caused by some 
unconsidered variable, the conclusion that the opinion may "signal" a 
risk shift to the market is still valid. This study does not attempt 
to determine causality. 
In addition, as may have occurred with the return studies, the 
change in beta or total risk resulting from the events causing the 
qualification may be completely offset by changes in risk resulting 
from other unrelated occurrences in some cases leading to the insigni-
ficant results seen in some of the tests. However, this is not consid-
ered to be as large a problem as experienced by the return studies for 
two reasons. First, the described control procedures should be more 
effective than those used in the other studies. Two groups are used 
that are more similar, resulting in less confounding events than in the 
other studies. Second, many unrelated events that occur only effect 
the stock returns. This type of occurrence causes one-time-only 
adjustments in the stock price and should have no effect on beta or 
total risk. 
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Finally, the impact of the opinion itself on the market is not 
determined. The market may already have incorporated all of the infor-
mation contained in the opinion by the time it is issued. The opinion 
then may only officially verify the market's reaction. However, since 
auditors do not determine their reporting standards based upon the mar-
ket's interpretation of information contained in the items reported, 
the question of a relationship betw~en risk shifts and'"subject to" 
qualified opinions still has importance for the field of auditing. 
Significance and Suggestions For Future Research 
This study helps to answer an important question in auditing, 
whether an auditor's report containing a "red flag", such as the "sub-
ject to" qualified opinion or the explanatory paragraph (SAS 58 and SAS 
59), serves a purpose in financial reporting. 
Results from the total risk studies suggested that, for companies 
receiving two types of qualifications, a risk shift did occur. For 
those companies obtaining going concern qualifications, all of the 
tests indicated that a change in total risk had occurred. This result 
was a significant finding because no risk shift was noted by the only 
previous study which addressed total risk [Alderman, 1977]. In addi-
tion, two of the three tests suggested that the asset valuation compa-
nies also experienced a change in total risk. Again, no previous study 
has presented as much evidence that such a shift may have occurred. 
The litigation portfolio was the only one for which no change in 
total risk was found. None of the tests conducted on this data indi-
82 
cated that a shift occurred. Therefore, the litigation company results 
are identical to those obtained by Alderman [1977] in his study. 
Finally, none of the portfolios indicated a change in beta. The 
parameter of interest in the dummy variable regression was not found to 
be significant in any of the three cases. These findings are in line 
with those found in the portion of Alderman's study in which he ad-
dressed beta changes. However, this finding is different from the re-
sults of both of the other' two studies addressing this issue, Shank, 
Murdock, and Dillard [1982] and Finnerty and Oliver [1985], which found 
beta shifts. 
For the asset valuation and going concern companies, these results 
indicate that the only shift which occurred was a result of changes in 
the unsystematic portion of risk. Therefore, for companies with these 
types of contingencies, it seems as though the auditors' opinions pro-
vide a service to the investor, acting as a "red flag" to warn of in-
creases in the level of total risk. As no changes in either total or 
systematic risk were noted for the litigation cases, this study found 
no support for the continuance of a special opinion under those circum-
stances. 
Additional research could provide further insights into the impact 
of this type of opinion on investors. Behavioral research needs to be 
conducted to determine whether the risk changes noted in the tests were 
the result of reaction to the opinion itself or to the underlying 
events. In addition, behavioral research could indicate whether the 
new audit report format provides a more effective signal to the market 
than that containing the "subject to" opinion did. Perhaps new, more 
efficient wording could be devised. Testing also needs to be conducted 
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in order to provide more support for the continuance or discontinuance 
of the qualification in the cases of litigation contingencies. These 
studies could take the form of either behavioral or empirical tests. 
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ASSET VALUATION 
COMPANY NAME MATCH # YEAR END 
ACRO ENERGY 1 3/31/85 
ADVANCED COMPUTER TECHNIQUES 2 12/31/83 
ALLEGHENY BEVERAGE 3 3/20/85 
CMI CORP 4 12/31/85 
CONTROL LASER INTERNATIONAL 5 12/31/87 
CURTISS-WRIGHT CORP 6 12/31/84 
EARTH SCIENCES 7 12/31/86 
FAIRCHILD IND 8 12/31/85 
FUQUA 9 12/31/86 
IDLE WILD FOODS 10 8/31/85 
KAISER CEMENT 11 12/31/83 
KIN ARK 12 12/31/86 
MICRO DYNE 13 10/28/84 
MINERALS ENGINEERING 14 12/31/84 
NORLIN CORP 15 12/31/84 
OVERMYER CORP 16 12/31/83 
PARTNERS OIL AND GAS 17 12/31/83 
PHELPS DODGE 18 12/31/84 
RATLIFF DRILLING AND EXPLORATION 19 9/30/84 
SAVIN CORP 20 4/30/84 
SEA GALLEY STORES 21 12/29/85 
TECHTRAN IND 22 8/31/84 
TOPSY'S INTERNATIONAL 23 7/26/86 
90 
LITIGATION 
COMPANY NAME MATCH # YEAR END 
ALAMCO 1 12/31/86 
ALPHA INDUSTRIES 2 3/31/86 
AMERICAN SOLAR KING 3 7/31/84 
ARGONAUT ENERGY 4 3/31/85 
AVX CORP 5 12/31/84 
COMMODORE INTERNATIONAL 6 6/30/85 
COMPUTER MEMORIES 7 3/31/86 
COMPUTERV!SION 8 12/31/83 
CONSOLIDATED OIL AND GAS 9 11/30/84 
ENTRE' COMPUTERS io 8/31/86 
EQUIPMENT COMPANY OF AMERICA 11 12/31/87 
EXCEL ENERGY 12 12/31/83 
FLOATING POINT SYSTEMS 13 10/31/86 
GENERAL DEVICES 14 12/31/83 
GENERAL NUTRITION 15 2/31/85 
GENISCO TECHNOLOGY 16 9/30/87 
GOOD TACO 17 3/04/85 
HELM RESOURCES 18 12/31/83 
INFO DESIGNS 19 12/31/85 
INTECOM 20 12/31/85 
IOMEGA 21 12/31/86 
KLEER VU 22 12/31/83 
K-TRON 23 12/28/85 
MC DOWELL ENT 24 12/31/83 
MCDERMOTT INTERNATIONAL 25 3/31/85 
MONOCLONAL ANTIBODIES 26 3/31/87 
NEWPORT PHARM 27 4/30/86 
PERCEPTRONICS 28 3/31/85 
PITTSBURGH DES MOINES 29 12/31/83 
SIERRACIN CORP 30 12/31/85 
SPECTRA PHYSICS 31 9/30/83 
SUPERIOR CARE 32 3/30/84 
TEXACO 33 12/31/85 
TEXAS INTERN~TIONAL 34 12/31/85 
UNITED STATES SURGICAL 35 12/31/83 
USR INDUSTRIES 36 12/31/84 
WINNERS CORP 37 12/31/86 
WM E WRIGHT CO 38 6/30/86 
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GOING CONCERN 
COMPANY NAME MATCH # YEAR END 
MONTH YEAR 
ALLEGHENY INT'L 1 12 86 
AMERICAN .HEALTHCARE MGT 2 12 86 
ANGLO,ENERGY 3 9 83 
BARTON VALVE 4 9 86 
BERRY IND 5 12 83 
BIW 6 12 87 
BROCK HOTEL CORP 7 12 84 
BUTTES OIL AND GAS 8 12 84 
COLECO IND 9 12 87 
COMTECH 10 7 84 
CONTROL DATA 11 12 85 
CRAWFORD ENERGY 12 8 84 
CRUTCHER RESOURCES 13 12 85 
DAMSON OIL 14 9 86 
DATAPOWER 15 3 86 
DEL TAUS 16 12 87 
EASTMET 17 12 84 
ELECTRONICS MISSILES 18 3 85 
FAFCO 19 12 83 
FLAKEY JAKES 20 12 85 
GALVESTON HOUSTON 21 12 84 
GENEX CORP 22 12 86 
GLOBAL MARINE 23 12 85 
GOLDFIELD CORP 24 12 84 
HE! 25 8 86 
HELIONETICS 26 12 85 
HOLLYWOOD PARK REALTY 27 12 86 
KANEB SERVICES 28 12 86 
KENAI 29 1 85 
KRATOS 30 12 83 
" LITTLEFIELD ADAMS 31 12 86 
LTV CORP 32 12 86 
MAN GOOD 33 12 85 
MARCADE GROUP 34 1 85 
ME DAR 35 12 87 
NCA 36 12 85 
PENRIL 37 7 86 
PERSONAL DIAGNOSTICS 38 9 86 
PORTEC 39 12 87 
READING & BATES 40 12 87 
RONSON CORP 41 12 84 
SCIENTIFIC RADIO 42 6 84 
STANDARD LOGIC 43 10 86 
STRATA 44 12 85 
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GOING CONCERN cont. 
COMPANY NAME MATCH # YEAR END 
MONTH YEAR 
STRUTHERS WELLS 45 11 85 
TEXFI IND 46 10 84 
THORATEC 47 12 85 
THOUSAND TRAILS 48 12 86 
WEAN INC 49 12 87 
WILTON so 7 85 
APPENDIX B 
PRIMARY CONTROL FIRMS 
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ASSET VALUATION 
COMPANY NAME MATCH # YEAR END 
SCHWAB SAFE 1 12/31/84 
FOOTE, CONE & BELDING 2 12/31/83 
MAP CO 3 12/31/84 
THERMO ELECTRON 4 12/28/85 
VICON IND 5 9/30/87 
A.O. SMITH 6 12/31/84 
FOOTE MINERAL CO 7 12/31/86 
GATES LEARJET 8 12/31/85 
AERO SERVICES 9 9/30/86 
THORN APPLE VALLEY 10 5/31/85 
SUSQUEHANNA CORP 11 12/31/83 
HEALTH-CHEM 12 12/31/86 
MAGNETIC CONTROLS 13 10/31/84 
HECLA MINING 14 12/31/84 
AMEDCO 15 12/31/84 
ZENTEC CORP 16 12/31/83 
RATLIFF DRILLING 17 12/31/83 
ASARCO INC 18 12/31/84 
BARNWELL 19 9/30/84 
AMFAC 20 12/31/83 
MR STEAK 21 9/29/85 
CORVUS SYSTEMS 22 5/31/84 
MERET (FORMERLY'CALIBRE) . 23 7/27/86 
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LITIGATION 
COMPANY NAME MATCH # YEAR END 
ENERGY VENTURES 1 12/31/86 
LYNCH COMMUNICATIONS 2 12/31/85 
REPUBLIC CORP 3 7/31/84 
GREAT AMERICAN RESOURCES 4 12/31/84 
CONTROL LASER 5 12/31/84 
SEAGATE 6 6/30/85 
REUTER 7 12/31/85 
PACIFIC }:..UMBER. 8 12/31/83 
PARKER DRILLING 9 8/31/84 
DIODES 10 4/30/86 
TRIANGLE INDUSTRIES 11 12/31/87 
CIBOLA ENERGY 12 12/31/83 
TELEVIDEO SYSTEMS 13 10/31/86 
MICHAEL BAKER CORP 14 1/01/84 
GREAT ATLANTIC AND PACIFIC TEA 15 2/23/85 
BOWMAR INSTRUMENT 16 9/30/87 
MORTRONICS 17 2/28/85 
BARUCH FOSTER 18 12/31/83 
UNIFORCE TEMPORARY PERSONNEL 19 12/31/85 
LYNCH COMMUNICATIONS 20 12/31/85 
MINI SCRIBE 21 12/28/86 
GREAT AMERICAN INDUSTRIES 22 12/31/83 
DEVELCON ELECTRONICS 23 8/31/85 
ENSTAR CORP 24 12/31/83 
TRANS TECHNOLOGY 25 3/31/85 
GENENTECH 26 12/31/86 
BOLAR PHARM 27 12/31/85 
SCIENCE MANAGEMENT 28 12/31/84 
REP CO 29 12/31/83 
PACIFIC SCIENTIFIC CO 30 12/31/85 
COHERENT 31 10/01/83 
FORUM GROUP 32 3/31/84 
TEXAS AMERICAN ENERGY 33 12/31/85 
DAMSON OIL 34 9/30/85 
COBE LAB 35 12/31/83 
RMS ELECTRONICS 36 12/31/84 
SKIPPER'S 37 12/31/86 
UNIFI 38 6/29/86 
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GOING CONCERN 
COMPANY NAME MATCH # YEAR END 
MONTH YEAR 
LYNCH CORP 1 12 86 
DATATAB 2 12 86 
SEISCOM ,DELTA 3 9 83 
RAGEN CORP 4 9 86 
AMERICAN MOTORS 5 12 83 
OREGON METALLURGICAL 6 12 87 
SERVICO 7 12 84 
HENDERSON PET 8 12 84 
TRANS LUX CORP 9 12 87 
GENERAL AUTOMATION 10 7 84 
LSB IND 11 12 85 
PETX PET 12 8 84 
CIBLOA 13 12 85 
GEO INT'L 14 9 86 
LORAL CORP 15 3 86 
GTS CORP 16 12 87 
ATHLONE 17 12 84 
UNIVERSAL SECURITY INSTRUMENT 18 3 85 
ENERSERV 19 12 83 
FUDDRUCKERS 20 12 85 
VARGO INT'L 21 12 84 
IROQUOIS BRANDS 22 12 86 
SAXON OIL 23 12 85 
GULF RESOURCES 24 12 84 
ADVANCE CIRCUITS 25 8 86 
A T & E CORP 26 12 85 
RESORT INT'L 27 12 86 
PYRO ENERGY 28 12 86 
GEARHART IND 29 1 85 
BIO RAD 30 12 83 
KAY CORP 31 12 86 
ATHLONE IND 32 12 86 
INMED 33 12 85 
MANHATTAN IND 34 1 85 
TENNEY ENG 35 12 87 
MICKELBERRY 36 12 85 
TECHNO DYNE 37 7 86 
ANACOMP 38 9 86 
TENNEY ENG 39 12 87 
GTS 40 12 87 
ACTON 41 12 84 
CRAIG CORP 42 6 84 
HURCO 43 10 86 
CIBOLA ENERGY 44 12 85 
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GOING CONCERN Cont. 
COMPANY NAME MATCH # YEAR END 
MONTH YEAR 
J L CLARK MFG 45 11 85 
J P STEVENS 46 10 84 
AT & E CORP 47 12 85 
RESORTS INT'L 48 12 86 
TENNEY ENG 49 12 87 
UNA CORP 50 7 85 
APPENDIX C 
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ASSET VALUATION 
COMPANY NAME MATCH # YEAR END 
ANDERSON, GREENWOOD & CO 1 12/31/84 
BUTLER MFG 1 12/31/84 
BRADFORD NATIONAL CORP 2 12/31/83 
BRENCO 4 12/31/85 
CHICAGO PNEUMATIC TOOL 4 1/03/86 
COMPUTERVISION' 4 12/31/85 
NORTH ATLANTIC IND 4 12/28/85 
COMPUTER PRODUCTS 5 12/31/87 
KUHLMAN CORP 5 12/31/87 
MICRODYNE CORP 5 12/31/87 
PORTA SYSTEMS 5 12/31/87 
D.A.B. IND 6 12/31/84 
FAIRCHILD IND 6 12/31/84 
GRUMMAN CORP 6 12/31/84 
GULFSTREAM AEROSPACE 6 12/31/84 
HELGA MINING 7 12/31/86 
M A HANNA 7 12/31/86 
NORTHGATE EXPLORATION CO 7 12/31/86 
SUNSHINE MINING 7 12/31/86 
AERONCA 8 12/31/85 
AMERICAN STANDARD 8 12/31/85 
UNITED TECHNOLOGIES 8 - 12/31/85 
ZIMMER CORP 8 12/31/85 
FMC CORP 12 12/31/86 
GILLETTE 12 12/31/86 
SHAKLEE CORP 12 12/31/86 
SHERWIN-WILLIAMS 12 12/31/86 
INTEGRATED CIRCUITS 13 10/31/84 
AMAX 14 12/31/84 
ASARCO INC 14 12/31/84 
COMINCO LTD 14 12/31/84 
!NCO 14 12/31/84 
COLE CO 15 12/31/84 
GALVESTON HOUSTON 16 12/31/83 
GENERAL BINDING 16 12/31/83 
MODULAR COMPUTER SYSTEMS 16 12/31/83 
ROBBINS & MYERS 16 8/31/83 
BURTON/HAWKS 17 12/31/83 
HENDERSON PETROLEUM 17 12/31/83 
STANDARD OIL CO - OHIO 17 12/31/83 
TEXAS INTERNATIONAL 17 12/31/83 
AMAX 18 12/31/84 
COMINCO LTD 18 12/31/84 
HEClA MINING 18 12/31/84 
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ASSET VALUATION Cont. 
COMPANY NAME MATCH # YEAR END 
!NCO 18 12/31/84 
PEABODY INTERNATIONAL 19 9/30/84 
PRODUCTION OPR CORP 19 9/30/84 
HORN & HARDART 21 12/28/85 
MOHAWK DATA SCIENCES 22 4/30/84 
CHI-CHI'S 23 4/30/86 
COLLINS FOODS INTERNATIONAL 23 4/30/86 
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LITIGATION 
COMPANY NAME MATCH # YEAR END 
BARNWELL INDUSTRIES 1 9/30/86 
CENERGY CORP 1 12/31/86 
MCFARLAND ENERGY 1 12/31/86 
COMPRESSION LABS 2· 12/31/85 
HCC 2 3/29/86 
RMS ELECTRONICS 2 12/31/85 
TRANSDUCER SYSTEMS 2 12/31/85 
GLOBAL NATURAL RESOURCES 4 12/31/84 
INEXCO OIL 4 12/31/84 
KN ENERGY 4 12/31/84 
TRANSCO EXPLORATION PARTNERS 4 12/31/84 
KLOSS VIDEO 5 12/31/84 
RMS ELECTRONICS 5 12/31/84 
COMPUTER MEMORIES 6 3/31/85 
EMULEX CORP 6 6/30/85 
KEY TRONICS 6 6/30/85 
PRIAM CORP 6 6/30/85 
ADAGE 7 12/31/85 
AUTOMAT IX 7 12/31/85 
BETHLEHEM CORP 7 12/31/85 
LYNCH CORP 7 12/31/85 
AMERICAN PRECISION 8 12/30/83 
BROWN AND SHARPE 8 12/31/83 
MILTON ROY 8 12/31/83 
STORAGE TECHNOLOGIES 8 12/30/83 
BARUCH FOSTER 12 12/31/83 
ENERGY VENTURES 12 12/31/83 
SUNDANCE OIL 12 12/31/83 
WAINOCO 12 12/31/83 
AM INTERNATIONAL 13 7/31/86 
APPLIED MATERIALS 13 10/31/86 
SEAGATE TECHNOLOGY 13 7/31/86 
ACME-CLEVELAND 16 9/30/87 
DAISY SYSTEMS 16 9/30/87 
OUTBOARD MARINE 16 9/30/87 
CIBOLA ENERGY 18 12/31/83 
ENERGY VENTURES 18 12/31/83 
SUNDANCE OIL 18 12/31/83 
WAINOCO 18 12/31/83 
AMERICAN MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS 19 12/31/85 
MICROPRO INTERNATIONAL,CORP 19 8/31/85 
NETWORK SECuRITY 19 12/31/85 
SCIENCE MANAGEMENT CORP 19 12/31/85 
EECO INC 20 12/29/85 
RMS 20 12/31/85 
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LITIGATION Cont. 
COMPANY NAME MATCH# YEAR END 
TRANSDUCER 20 12/31/85 
MONOLITHIC MEMORIES 21 9/28/86 
M/A-COM 21 9/27/86 
COMPRESSION lABS 23 12/31/85 
EECO INC 23 12/29/85 
ENTRE COMPUTER 23 8/31/85 
LEXICON 23 8/31/85 
p & F 25 12/31/84 
BINDLEY WESTERN 27 12/31/85 
PENNWALT CORP 27 12/31/85 
ROHM AND HAUS 27 12/31/85 
ARTHUR D. LITTLE 28 12/31/84 
A 0 SMITH 30 12/31/85 
ECHLIN 30 8/31/85 
CAM-OR 33 12/31/85 
MACMILLAN RING-FREE OIL 33 12/31/85 
BOGERT OIL 34 9/30/85 
MAY ENERGY 34 12/31/85 
PARLIAMENT HILL 34 8/31/85 
TRANSCO EXPLORATION 34 12/31/85 
POLAROID 35 12/31/83 
XEROX 35 12/31/83 
CONTROL LASER 36 12/31/84 
KLOSS VIDEO 36 12/31/84 
FAMOUS RESTAURANTS 37 12/31/86 
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GOING CONCERN 
COMPANY NAME MATCH # YEAR END 
MONTH YEAR 
AUTO TROL TECH 1 12 86 
CTI CORP 1 12 86 
ISOMET 1 12 86 
SUPERIOR ELECTRIC 1 12 86 
BERKEY 2 12 86 
HI PORT 2 12 86 
MARKET FACTS 2 12 86 
QUESTECH ·2 12 86 
BARNWELL IND 3 9 83 
DAMSON 3 9 83 
ICO 3 9 83 
RATLIFF DRILLING 3 9 83 
NUCLEAR METALS 4 9 86 
SIFCO IND 4 9 86 
AERONCA 5 12 83 
CHAMPION PARTS REBUILDERS 5 12 83 
FREHAUF 5 12 83 
KYSOR INDUSTRIAL 5 12 83 
ARMADA 6 12 87 
HANDY & HARMAN 6 12 87 
LINDBERG 6 12 87 
METALLURGICAL IND 6 12 87 
HILTON HOTELS 7 12 84 
HOLIDAY CORP 7 12 84 
KAHLER 7 12 84 
ARGO PET 8 12 84 
BEARD OIL 8 12 84 
HARKEN OIL & GAS 8 12 84 
TEXAS INTERNATIONAL 8 12 84 
ALLEN ORGAN CL B 9 12 87 
BIC CORP 9 12 87 
CROSS (AT) & CO CL A 9 12 87 
GOODY PRODUCTS 9 12 87 
DATAPOINT 10 7' 84 
ELECTRO AUDIO DYNAMICS 10 7 84 
HERLEY MICROWAVE 10 7 84 
ICOT 10 7 84 
HESSTON 11 12 85 
LODGE & SHIPLEY 11 12 85 
SELAS 11 12 85 
WEAN UNITED 11 12 85 
PETRO LEWIS 12 8 84 
PRESIDO OIL 12 8 84 
ROYAL RESOURCES 12 8 84 
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GOING CONCERN Cont. 
COMPANY NAME MATCH # YEAR END 
MONTH YEAR 
SAGE ENERGY 12 8 84 
ALAMCO 13 12 '85 
BURTON HAWKS 13 12 85 
GALAXY 13 12 85 
HERSHEY 13 12 85 
ATWOOD OCEANICS 14 9 86 
BARNWELL 14 9 86 
CABOT CORP 14 9 86 
PRODUCTION OPERATORS 14 9 86 
KRM PET 16 12 87 
MAY PET 16 12 87 
UNIT 16 12 87 
WILSHIRE OIL 16 12 87 
ANDAL 17 12 84 
ARMADA 17 12 84 
LINDBERG 17 12 84 
TRIANGLE IND 17 12 84 
ADVANCED MICRO DEVICES 18 3 85 
BARON DATA SYSTEMS 18 3 85 
LEE DATA 18 3 85 
LORAL CORP 18 3 85 
ALLIED PRODUCTS 19 12 83 
ARTRA 19 12 83 
DRIVER HARRIS 19 12 83 
TRIANGLE 19 12 83 
EL TORITO 20 12 85 
PIZZA INN 20 12 85 
SHONEY'S SOUTH 20 12 85 
WINNERS 20 12 85 
BETHLEHEM CORP 21 12 84 
HEIN-WERNER 21 12 84 
MAN GOOD 21 12 84 
SELAS 21 12 84 
DDI PHARM 22 12 86 
KLEER.VU 22 12 86 
NL IND 22 12 86 
TECHAMERICA GROUP 22 12 86 
DEL TAUS 23 12 85 
EN SOURCE 23 12 85 
HERSHEY OIL 23 12 85 
WAINOCO OIL 23 12 85 
EASTERN GAS & FUEL 24 12 84 
KANEB SERVICES 24 12 84 
PITTSTON 24 12 84 
PYRO ENERGY 24 12 84 
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GOING CONCERN Cont. 
COMPANY NAME MATCH # YEAR END 
MONTH YEAR 
ROBBINS & MYERS 25 8 86 
SHELDAHL 25 8 86 
WASHINGTON SCIENTIFIC 25 8 86 
COMPUTER CONSOLES 26 12 85 
INTERNATIONAL POWER MACHINES 26 12 85 
TELECONCEPTS 26 12 85 
ZENTEC.CORP 26 12 85 
GOLDEN NUGGET ' 27 12 86 
RAMADA 27 12 86 
SANTA ANITA REAJ:,.TY 27 12. 86 
AMAX INC 28 12 86 
GULF RES & CHEM 28 12 86 
PITTSTON 28 12 86 
MITCHEL ENERGY 29 1 85 
NAHOMA & WENGANT 29 1 85 
HORIZON RESOURCES 30 12 83 
INSTRON 30 12 83 
MARK CONTROLS 30 12 83 
USR 30 12 83 
CULBRO 31 12 86 
HELM RESOURCES 31 12 86 
HOWELL CORP 31 12 86 
INTERCITY GAS 31 12 86 
ARMADA 32 12 86 
FOOTE MINERAL 32 12 86 
METALLURGICAL IND 32 12 86 
OVERMYER 32 12 86 
GENRAD 33 12 85 
HORIZON RESEARCH 33 12 85 
INSTRON 33 12 85 
MARK CONTROLS 33 12 85 
ANGELICA CORP 34 1 85 
PHILLIPS VAN HEUSEN 34 1 85 
RAVEN IND 34 1 85 
RUSS TOGS 34 1 85 
BIRD 35 12 87 
CMI 35 12 87 
HEIN WERNER 35 12 87 
LYNCH CORP 35 12 87 
DOYLE DANE 36 12 85 
ISS INT'L 36 12 85 
JOHN BLAIR 36 12 85 
MARKET FACTS 36 12 85 
CONOLOG 37 7 86 
HERLEY MICROWAVE 37 7 86 
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GOING CONCERN Cont. 
COMPANY NAME MATCH # YEAR END 
MONTH YEAR 
PICO PRODUCTS 37 7 86 
SYSTEM IND 37 7 86 
BOOLE '& BABBAGE 38 9 86 
GENERAL EMPLOY 38 9 86 
ROBOTIC VISION 38 9 86 
STERLING SOFTWARE 38 9 86 
BIRD INC 39 12 87 
CMI 39 12 87 
HEIN WERNER 39 12 87 
LYNCH 39 12 87 
APACHE CORP 40 12 87 
KRM 40 12 87 
UNIT 40 12 87 
WILSHIRE OIL 40 12 87 
AUTOMAT IX 41 12 84 
DATA SWITCH 41 12 84 
DOCUTEL OLIVETTI 41 12 84 
TELECONCEPTS 41 12 84 
CASABLANCA IND 42 6 84 
KLOSS 42 6 84 
RAMTEK 42 6 84 
SCI SYSTEMS 42 6 84 
CONCHEMCO 43 10 86 
INTERMEDICS 43 10 86 
POWELL 43 10 86 
SFE 43 10 86 
ALAMCO 44 12 85 
BURTON HAWKS 44 12 85 
GALAXY OIL 44 12 85 
HERSHEY OIL 44 12 85 
COMPUTER CONSOLES 47 12 85 
INT'L POWER MACHINES 47 12 85 
TELECONCEPTS 47 12 85 
ZENTEC 47 12 85 
GOLDEN NUGGET 48 12 86 
RAMADA 48 12 86 
SANTA ANITA REALTY 48 12 86 
BIRD INC 49 12 87 
CMI 49 12 87 
HEIN WERNER 49 12 87 
LYNCH 49 12 87 
ANIXTER BROS 50 7 85 
BASTIAN IND 50 7 85 
LD BRINKMAN 50 7 85 
APPENDIX D 
VARIANCE TEST RESULTS BY COMPANY 
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ASSET VALUATION EXPERIMENTAL COMPANIES 
NAME 
ACRO ENERGY 
ADV COMPUTER TECHNIQUES 
ALLEGHENY BEVERAGE 
CMI CORP 
CONTROL LASER INT 
CURTISS-WRIGHT CORP 
EARTH SCIENCES 
FAIRCHILD IND 
FUQUA 
IDLE WILD FOODS 
KAISER CEMENT 
KINARK 
MICRODYNE 
MINERALS ENGINEERING 
NORLIN CORP 
OVERMYER CORP 
PARTNERS OIL AND GAS 
PHELPS DODGE 
RATLIFF DRILLING 
SAVIN CORP 
SEA GALLEY STORES 
TECHTRAN IND 
TOPSY'S INTERNATIONAL 
STD STD 
VARIANCE 
MATCH # PERIOD 1 
1 15.5815 
2 58.8936 
3 14.1074 
4 15.8365 
5 49.2859 
6 0. 9116 
7 14.6642 
8 8. 7171 
9 6.6755 
10 0.9687 
11 1.6053 
12 18.2193 
13 14.6730 
14 19.9176 
15 9.7034 
16 5.7281 
17 7.7879 
18 5.8428 
19 29.3347 
20 39.7772 
21 26.5951 
22 282.6896 
23 392.1901 
VARIANCE 
PERIOD 2 
408.7283 
25.4840 
15.5633 
21.5418 
35.3049 
4.3362 
29.1749 
5. 7235 
2.8097 
23.6904 
5.9446 
14.1477 
32.0765 
42.1383 
11.0242 
30.5293 
938.1267 
11.6091 
216. i159 
15.0243 
14.6229 
14.8604 
10.5522 
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F-VALUE 
26.2317 
2. 3110 
1.1032 
1.3603 
1. 3960 
4.7568 
1. 9895 
1.5230 
2.3758 
24.4546 
3.7031 
i. 2878 
2.1861 
2.1156 
1.1361 
5.3297 
120.4601 
1. 9869 
7.3707 
2.6475 
1. 8187 
19.0230 
37.1665 
ASSET VALUATION CONTROL COMPANIES 
NAME 
SCHWAB SAFE 
FOOTE, CONE & BELDING 
MAP CO 
THERMO ELECTRON 
VICON IND 
A.O. SMITH 
FOOTE MINERAL CO. 
GATES LEARJET 
AERO SERVICES 
THRON APPLE VALLEY 
SUSQUEHANNA CORP 
HEALTH-CHEM 
MAGNETIC CONTROLS 
HECLA MINING 
AMEDCO 
ZENTEC CORP 
RATLIFF DRILLING 
ASARCO INC 
BARNWELL 
AMFAC 
MR STEAK 
CORVUS SYSTEMS 
MERET (FORMERLY CALIBRE) 
STD 
VARIANCE 
MATCH # PERIOD 1 
1 18.4529 
2 0. 7736 
3 7.7844 
4 11.2292 
5 11.8005 
6 8.0034 
7 4.4664 
8 17.0772 
9 23.2320 
10 23.1319 
11 6.3144 
' 12 12.9914 
13 34.9547 
14 ;17.3816 
15 17.5744 
16 5.8042 
17 14.3914 
18 9.6976 
19 5.5289 
20 3.8852 
21 30.1448 
22 19.4457 
23 181.0379 
STD 
VARIANCE 
PERIOD 2 
3.4582 
1.6890 
3.0657 
14.7325 
15.7376 
22.2308 
6.1351 
14.6254 
13.1803 
27.3154 
19.2405 
4.3041 
21.5481 
18.4613 
56.9777 
65.0647 
23.7182 
16.1113 
4.9926 
4.9704 
10.9177 
71.5254 
12.6984 
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F-VALUE 
5.3360 
2.1833 
2.5392 
1.3120 
1.3336 
2. 7777 
1. 3736 
1.1676 
1. 7626 
1.1809 
3.0471 
3.0184 
1.6222 
1. 0621 
3.2421 
11.2100 
1.6481 
1. 6614 
1.1074 
1. 2793 
2. 7611 
3.6782 
14.2567 
LITIGATION EXPERIMENTAL COMPANIES 
NAME 
A LAM CO 
ALPHA'INDUSTRIES 
AMERICAN SOLAR KING 
ARGONAUT ENERGY 
AVX CORP 
COMMODORE INT 
COMPUTER MEMORIES 
COMPUTERVISION 
CONSOLIDATED 0 & G 
ENTRE' COMPUTERS 
EQUIPMENT COMPANY OF AM 
EXCEL ENERGY 
FLOATING POINT SYSTEMS 
GENERAL DEVICES 
GENERAL NUTRITION 
GENISCO TECHNOLOGY 
GOOD TACO 
HELM RESOURCES 
INFO DESIGNS 
INTECOM 
IOMEGA 
KLEER VU 
K-TRON 
MC DOWELL ENT 
MCDERMOTT INT 
MONOCLONAL ANTIBODIES 
NEWPORT PHARM 
PERCEPTRONICS 
PITTSBURGH DES MOINES 
SIERRACIN CORP 
SPECTRA PHYSICS 
SUPERIOR CARE 
TEXACO 
TEXAS INTERNATIONAL 
UNITED STATES SURGICAL 
USR INDUSTRIES 
WINNERS CORP 
WM E WRIGHT CO 
STD 
VARIANCE 
MATCH # PERIOD 1 
1 243.7231 
2 38.1882 
3 34.9784 
4 321.5878 
5 15.0211 
6 23.3687 
7 411.7461 
8 11.1599 
9 15.3286 
10 48.2840 
11 35.4880 
12 32.1404 
13 7.5100 
14 14.0957 
15 10.2459 
16 10.9640 
17 15.3119 
18 24.1590 
19 138.6822 
20 16.4912 
21 11.4054 
22 27.9045 
23 44.9465 
24 7.8107 
25 5.7426 
26 14.4676 
27 96.5614 
28 45.3115 
29 5.584) 
30 15.1303 
31 7.4865 
32 34.9973 
33 2.3465 
34 250.3752 
35 5.3497 
36 44.8715 
37 18.2998 
38 6. 2116 
STD 
VARIANCE 
PERIOD 2 
86.8300 
3.4530 
33.4653 
104.0379 
42.4731 
68.9350 
23.0899 
19.9392 
8.8607 
30.2846 
24.2285 
21589.8100 
9.1313 
11.4145 
54.3947 
15.4222 
96.0589 
39.2270 
20.4832 
67.7762 
12.0793 
50.4948 
67.0613 
23.7161 
7.1520 
53.8568 
63.5139 
76.7345 
2.4097 
13.1427 
6.7339 
191.5295 
4.9190 
52.0085 
10.0298 
56.5947 
14.8513 
1. 2197 
110 
F-VALUE 
2.8069 
11.0592 
1. 0452 
3. 0911 
2.8276 
2.9499 
17.8323 
1. 7867 
1.7300 
1.5943 
1.4647 
671.7345 
1. 2159 
1. 2349 
5.3089 
1.4066 
6.2735 
1. 6237 
6.7695 
4.1098 
1. 0591 
1.8096 
1.4921 
3.0364 
1.2454 
3. 7226 
1.5203 
1. 6935 
2.3176 
1.1512 
1.1118 
5.4727 
2.0963 
4.8141 
1. 8748 
1. 2613 
1.2322 
5.0928 
LITIGATION CONTROL COMPANIES 
NAME 
ENERGY VENTURES 
LYNCH COMMUNICATIONS 
REPUBLIC CORP 
GREAT AMERICAN RESOURCES 
CONTROL LASER 
SEAGATE 
REUTER 
PACIFIC LUMBER 
PARKER DRILLING 
DIODES 
TRIANGLE INDUSTRIES 
CIBOLA ENERGY 
TELEVIDEO SYSTEMS 
MICHAEL BAKER CORP 
GREAT ATL AND PAC TEA CO 
BOWMAR INSTRUMENT 
MORTRONICS 
BARUCH FOSTER 
UNIFORCE TEMP PERSONNEL 
LYNCH COMMUNICATIONS 
MINI SCRIBE 
GREAT AMERICAN IND 
DEVELCON ELECTRONICS 
ENSTAR CORP 
TRANS TECHNOLOGY 
GENENTECH 
BOLAR PHARM 
SCIENCE MANAGEMENT 
REP CO 
PACIFIC SCIENTIFIC co 
COHERENT 
FORUM GROUP 
TEXAS AMERICAN ENERGY 
DAMSON OIL 
COBE LAB 
RMS ELECTRONICS 
SKIPPER'S 
UNIFI 
STD 
VARIANCE 
MATCH # PERIOD 1 
1 3.1529 
2 21.9915 
3 7. 5971 
4 6.9323 
5 117.3700 
6 47.7517 
7. 25.7372 
8 5.8527 
9 19.5357 
10 20.8779 
11 10.2961 
12 22.4979 
13 110.0057 
14 2.3484 
15 10.9786 
16 14.9260 
17 91.0548 
18 10.7024 
19 0.5260 
20 13.6335 
21 396.0897 
22 3.2447 
23. 15.1991 
24 6.4328 
25 10.8878 
26 277.0137 
27 23.2830 
28 50.5780 
29 3.2538 
30 7.5909 
31 9.8169 
32 15.2605 
33 16.9757 
34 24.9786 
35 2.9923 
36 8.2836 
37 6.1305 
38 19.6845 
STD 
VARIANCE 
PERIOD 2 
5.0898 
24.0261 
0.7852 
24.8418 
91.9060 
9.1977 
9.0700 
6. 7613 
13.2979 
21.9278 
1. 7646 
13.5574 
16.8270 
3.3116 
11.2172 
71.8865 
140.2110 
3.9662 
10.6364 
20.5207 
10.9481 
1. 6075 
8.9789 
8.3448 
20.2901 
12.8694 
23.0960 
21.7848 
19.8042 
2.8456 
17.8929 
20.7606 
22.9934 
41.2369 
146.9024 
19.5319 
6.1649 
11.0497 
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F-VALUE 
1. 6143 
1. 0925 
9.6752 
3.5835 
1.2771 
5.1917 
2.8377 
1.1552 
1. 4691 
1.0503 
5.8347 
1. 6595 
6.5370 
1.4101 
1. 0217 
4.8162 
1. 5399 
2.6984 
20.2222 
1.5052 
36.1789 
2.0185 
1. 6928 
1. 2972 
1.8636 
21.5249 
1.0081 
2.3217 
6.0864 
2.6676 
1.8227 
1. 3604 
1. 3545 
1.6509 
49.0939 
2.3579 
1. 0056 
1. 7814 
GOING CONCERN EXPERIMENTAL COMPANIES 
NAME 
ALLEGHENY INT'L 
AMERICAN HEALTHCARE MGT 
ANGLO ENERGY 
BARTON VALVE 
BERRY IND 
BIW 
BROCK HOTEL CORP 
BUTTES OIL AND GAS 
COLECO IND 
COMTECH 
CONTROL DATA 
CRAWFORD ENERGY 
CRUTCHER RESOURCES 
DAMSON OIL 
DATAPOWER 
DEL TAUS 
EASTMET 
ELECTRONICS MISSILES 
FAFCO 
FLAKEY JAKES 
GALVESTON HOUSTON 
GENEX CORP 
GLOBAL MARINE 
GOLDFIELD CORP 
HE! 
HELIONETICS 
HOLLYWOOD PARK REALTY 
KANEB SERVICES 
KENAI 
KRATOS 
LITTLEFIELD ADAMS 
LTV CORP 
MAN GOOD 
MARCADE GROUP 
ME DAR 
NCA 
PENRIL 
PERSONAL DIAGNOSTICS 
PORTEC 
READING & BATES 
RONSON CORP 
SCIENTIFIC RADIO 
STANDARD LOGIC 
STRATA 
STD STD 
VARIANCE 
MATCH # PERIOD 1 
1 6.4828 
2 23.8417 
3 19.1482 
4 43.7435 
5 27.8519 
6 23.9479 
7 9.3823 
8 7.1306 
9 24.9093 
10 10.0681 
11 6.2150 
12 12.4869 
13 121.4965 
14 80.1523 
15 149.9201 
16 123.2655 
17 11.3231 
18 27.3403 
19 16.1924 
20 20.0023 
21 11.9468 
22 36.3539 
23 21.1192 
24 46.6071 
25 48.4378 
26 119.0723 
27 0.5677 
'28 7.8629 
29 7.8405 
30 8.8065 
31 11.2169 
32 23.9335 
33 13.0691 
34 35.7003 
35 9.8042 
36 12.3179 
37 16.0209 
38 25.6441 
39 10.0592 
40 60.2951 
41 50.2145 
42 4.8616 
43 97.0172 
44 7.5595 
VARIANCE 
PERIOD 2 
7.9464 
97.4506 
65.7532 
88.8127 
142.0326 
7.2424 
69.7468 
106.9920 
25.4439 
140.3850 
5.8404 
109.8625 
329.2880 
171.9008 
299.8524 
55.1435 
148.3914 
21.0257 
25.0169 
43.1386 
41.6730 
29.0383 
94.2706 
64.7362 
43.6593 
77.8621 
5.6002 
39.0567 
183.3493 
30.2276 
150.7846 
21.5633 
49.5270 
222.1319 
10.0421 
32.5903 
12.3443 
11.0353 
43.3310 
39.3155 
68.2180 
6.3975 
527.2291 
7.1751 
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F-VALUE 
1.2258 
4.0874 
3.4339 
2.0303 
5.0996 
3.3066 
7.4339 
15.0047 
1. 0216 
13.9436 
1.0641 
8.7982 
2.7103 
2.1447 
2.0001 
2.2354 
13.1053 
1.3003 
1.5450 
2.1567 
3.4882 
1. 2519 
4.4637 
1. 3890 
1.1095 
1. 5293 
9.8639 
4. 9672 
23.3850 
3.4324 
13.4426 
1.1099 
3. 7911 
6.2221 
1. 0243 
2.6458 
1.2978 
2.3238 
4.3067 
1.5336 
1.3585 
1. 3159 
5.4344 
1.0536 
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GOING CONCERN EXPERIMENTAL COMPANIES, Cont. 
NAME 
STRUTHERS WELLS 
TEXFI IND 
THORATEC 
THOUSAND TRAILS 
WEAN INC 
WILTON 
STD 
VARIANCE 
MATCH # PERIOD 1 
45 66.6368 
46 36.4300 
47 20.5390 
48 10.1535 
49 53.7986 
50 10.0512 
STD 
VARIANCE 
PERIOD 2 F-VALUE 
60.9405 1. 0935 
26.7090 1. 3640 
108.9362 5.3039 
15.5598 1. 5325 
34.7573 1. 5478 
185.6160 18.4671 
--- --- ------- --- --- --------- -
GOING CONCERN CONTROL COMPANIES 
NAME 
LYNCH CORP 
DATA TAB 
SEISCOM DELTA 
RAGEN CORP 
AMERICAN MOTORS 
OREGON METALLURGICAL 
SERVICO 
HENDERSON PET 
TRANS LUX CORP 
GENERAL AUTOMATION 
LSB IND 
PETX PET 
CIBLOA 
GEO INT'L 
LORAL CORP 
GTS CORP 
ATHLONE 
UNIVERSAL SECURITY INST 
ENERSERV 
FUDDRUCKERS 
VARGO INT'L 
IROQUOIS BRANDS 
SAXON OIL 
GULF REOURCES 
ADVANCE CIRCUITS 
A T & E CORP 
RESORT INT'L 
PYRO ENERGY 
GEARHART IND 
BIO RAD 
KAY CORP 
ATHLONE IND 
INMED 
MANHATTAN IND 
TENNEY ENG 
MICKELBERRY 
TECHNO DYNE 
ANACOMP 
TENNEY ENG 
GTS 
ACTON 
CRAIG CORP 
HURCO 
CIBOLA ENERGY 
STD STD 
VARIANCE 
MATCH # PERIOD 1 
1 21.1125 
2 0 
3 12.9594 
4 42.1598 
5 12.7334 
6 10.5407 
7 9.2754 
8 5.0624 
9 3.7694 
10 31.0602 
11 76.1559 
·12 0 
13 20.5700 
14 70.1002 
15 10.9017 
16 110.6087 
17 5.8530 
18 14.6026 
19 22.9961 
20 21.7213 
21 22.9572 
22 15.1442 
23 20.6049 
24 5.3650 
25 18.3418 
26 52.9342 
27, 7.9067 
28 16.7971 
29 10.9838 
30 8.3344 
31 10.2049 
32 5.4790 
33 1. 9814 
34 6.7657 
35 20.6762 
36 31.7822 
37 65.1528 
38 46.1630 
39 20.6762 
40 110.6087 
41 10.7388 
42 4.5805 
43 41.5868 
44 20.5700 
VARIANCE 
PERIOD 2 
2.4005 
0 
13.8265 
35.2967 
18.4522 
7.1084 
16.4309 
588.3076 
2.8529 
18.6292 
20.4074 
204.8972 
63.4943 
46.7228 
2.1446 
4.1796 
6.2480 
35.2197 
48.3236 
8.8906 
34.7612 
1 .. 7511 
207.7182 
33.4716 
45.0718 
8.1724 
2.1682 
3.8020 
8. 9877 
1. 3337 
10.6209 
5.7404 
3.9832 
7.8980 
23.0381 
9.8193 
89.5085 
34.9533 
8.3079 
4.1796 
69.7090 
6.4665 
70.9197 
65.0622 
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F-VALUE 
8.7952 
err 
10.6691 
1.1944 
1.4491 
1.4828 
1. 7714 
116.2115 
1. 3213 
1. 6673 
3.7318 
err 
3.0868 
1.5003 
5.0833 
26.4642 
1. 0675 
2.4119 
2.1014 
2.4432 
1.5142 
8.6484 
10.0810 
6.2389 
2.4573 
6.4772 
3.6467 
4.4179 
1. 2221 
6.2490 
10.4077 
10.4771 
2.0103 
1.1674 
1.1142 
3.2367 
1. 3738 
1.3207 
2.4887 
26.4642 
6.4913 
1.4118 
1.7053 
3.1630 
NAME 
J L CLARK MFG 
J P STEVENS 
AT & E CORP 
RESORTS INT'L 
TENNEY ENG 
UNA CORP 
GOING CONCERN CONTROL COMPANIES Cont. 
STD 
VARIANCE 
MATCH # PERIOD 1 
45 1.1032 
46 13.9814 
47 52.9342 
48 7.9067 
49 20.6762 
50 5.9572 
STD 
VARIANCE 
PERIOD 2 
0.6655 
18.7383 
8.2201 
4.4351 
12.6949 
111.4471 
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F-VALUE 
1. 6577 
1.3402 
6.4396 
1.7828 
1. 6287 
18.7080 
APPENDIX E 
COMPANIES WITH BETA SHIFTS 
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117 
DIRECTION 
PORTFOLIO COMPANY MATCH # OF BETA CHANGE 
ASSET VALUATION FAIRCHILD INDUSTRIES 8 decrease 
LITIGATION GOOD TACO 17 increase 
NEWPORT PHARM 27 increase 
GOING CONCERN BUTTES 0 & G 8 decrease 
GENEX CORP 22 increase 
HELIONETICS 26 decrease 
KENAI 29 increase 
PORTEC 39 increase 
RONSON CORP 41 decrease 
APPENDIX F 
DOMINANCE CHARACTERISTICS BY COMPANY 
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ASSET VALUATION PORTFOLIO 
COMPANY NAME MATCH # FIRST PERIOD 
SDC CDS NEUT 
ACRO ENERGY 1 9 21 44 
ADVANCED ,COMPUTER TECH 2 3 0 71 
ALLEGHENY BEVERAGE 3 8 23 43 
C M I CORP 4 22 8 44 
CONTROL LASER 5 7 1 66 
CURTISS WRIGHT CORP 6 10 1 63 
EARTH SCIENCES 7 16 0 58 
FAIRCHILD IND 8 36 2 36 
FUQUA INDS INC 9 44 2 28 
IDLE WILD F00:9S 10 30 0 44 
KAISER CEMENT CORP 11 21 4 49 
KINARK CORP 12 4 53 17 
MICRODYNE 13 18 10 46 
MINERALS ENGINEERING 14 4 38 32 
NORLIN 15 28 6 40 
OVERMYER 16 44 0 30 
PARTNERS OIL 17 58 0 ,16 
PHELPS DODGE CORP 18 29 4 41 
RATLIFF DRILLING & EXPL CO 19 2 61 11 
SAVIN CORP 20 11 1 62 
SEA GALLEY STORES 21 11 19 44 
TECHTRAN 22 1 7 66 
TOPSY'S 23 0 72 . 2 
SDC - experimental company dominated the control 
CDS - control company dominated the experimental company 
NEUT - neither company dominated 
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SECOND PERIOD 
SDC CDS NEUT 
0 71 3 
4 21 49 
10 21 43 
0 62 12 
1 58 15 
29 0 45 
0 0 74 
38 0 36 
17 7 50 
4 35 35 
7 17 so 
12 0 62 
1 25 48 
1 51 22 
4 18 52 
6 9 59 
0 0 74 
23 6 45 
0 2 72 
48 1 25 
5 29 40 
45 0 29 
1 34 39 
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LITIGATION PORTFOLIO 
COMPANY NAME MATCH # FIRST PERIOD SECOND PERIOD 
SDC CDS NEUT SDC CDS NEUT 
ALAMCO INC 1 0 10 97 0 44 63 
ALPHA INDUSTRIES 2 13 42 52 17 26 64 
AMERICAN SOLAR KING 3 0 94 13 12 24 71 
ARGONAUT ENERGY 4 0 90 17 3 87 17 
A V X CORP 5 7 66 34 13 39 55 
COMMODORE INT'L LTD 6 6 45 56 2 74 31 
COMPUTER MEMORIES 7 0 106 1 10 56 41 
COMPUTERVISION CORP 8 26 1 80 38 7 62 
CONSOLIDATED OIL & GAS 9 42 6 59 39 13 55 
ENTRE COMPUTER 10 7 67 33 4 75 28 
EQUIPMENT CO OF AM 11 14 3 90 4 19 84 
EXCEL ENERGY 12 3 89 15 0 0 107 
FLOATING POINT SYS 13 58 5 44 24 20 63 
GENERAL DEVICES 14 11 12 84 9 so 48 
GENERAL NUTRITION INC 15 17 23 67 4 79 24 
GENISCO TECHNOLOGY 16 31 8 68 19 18 70 
GOOD TACO 17 5 66 36 3 91 13 
HELM RES INC 18 7 18 82 8 51 48 
INFO DESIGNS 19 1 55 51 33 2 72 
INTECOM 20 20 36 51 23 0 84 
IOMEGA ',21 42 0 65 5 80 22 
KLEER VU INDS INC 22 14 0 93 5 60 42 
K TRON INT'L 23 11 6 90 10 4 93 
MC DOWELL ENTERPRISES 24 29 18 60 3 79 25 
MCDERMOTT INT'L 25 14 19 74 30 16 61 
MONOCLONAL ANTIBODIES 26 19 21 67 3 86 18 
NEWPORT PHARM 27 7 3 97 5 65 37 
PERCEPTRONICS 28 7 59 41 28 0 79 
PITT DES MOINES INC 29 29 14 64 45 3 59 
SIERRACIN CORP 30 46 7 54 20 9 78 
SPECTRA PHYSICS INC 31 20 1 86 20 27 60 
SUPERIOR CARE 32 17 1 89 0 89 18 
TEXACO INC 33 so 1 56 61 2 44 
-TEXAS !NT' L CO 34 1 0 106 5 42 60 
UNITED ST~TES SUR9ICAL 35 29· 0 78 37 10 60 
U S R INDS INC 36 13 1 93' 6 61 40 
WINNERS CORP 37 9 57 41 10 42 55 
WRIGHT WM E 38 43 7 57 47 3 57 
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GOING CONCERN PORTFOLIO 
COMPANY NAME MATCH # FIRST PERIOD SECOND PERIOD 
SDC CDS NEUT SDC CDS NEUT 
ALLEGHENY INT'L INC 1 37 so 141 0 168 60 
AMERICAN HEALTHCARE 2 26 43 159 1 99 128 
ANGLO ENERGY INC 3 6 22 200 6 35 187 
BARTON VALVE 4 221 0 7 17 0 211 
BERRY INDS CORP 5 3 134 91 0 156 72 
BIW CABLE_ 6 95 2 131 134 4 90 
BROCK HOTEL 7 211 0 17 130 0 98 
BUTTES OIL & GAS 8 53 40 135 0 202 26 
COLECO INDS INC 9 49 21 158 0 197 31 
COMTECH TECH 10 213 0 15 28 0 200 
CONTROL DATA pORP DEL 11 55 26 147 82 17 129 
CRAWFORD ENERGY INC 12 13 103 112 0 207 21 
CRUTCHER RES CORP 13 0 55 173 0 26 202 
DAMSON OIL CORP 14 9 60 159 0 46 182 
DATAPOWER 15 0 209 19 0 228 0 
DELTAUS 16 7 0 221 18 1 209 
EASTMET CORP 17 147 3 78 221 0 7 
ELECTRONICS MISSILES 18 220 0 8 204 4 20 
FAFCO 19 131 2 95 121 8 99 
FLAKEY JAKES 20 136 2 90 57 1 170 
GALVESTON HOUSTON co 21 45 53 130 10 142 76 
GENEX 22 102 2 124 96 0 132 
GLOBAL MARINE INC 23 48 46 134 1 62 165 
GOLDFIELD CORP 24 3 101 124 6 120 102 
HEI INC 25 42 2 184 226 0 2 
HELIONETICS 26 3 26 199 2 80 146 
HOLLYWOOD PARK REALTY 27 128 2 98 212 4 12 
KANEB SVCS INC 28 1 92 135 2 64 162 
KENAI 29 26 86 116 0 207 21 
KRATOS 30 222 0 6 152 0 76 
LITTLEFIELD ADAMS & co 31 43 36 149 1 99 128 
L T V CORP 32 28 65 135 37 16 175 
MAN GOOD 33 31 86 111 11 39 178 
MARCADE GROUP INC 34 3 178 47 0 212 16 
ME DAR 35 168 2 58 163 4 61 
NCA CORP 36 192 0 36 226 0 2 
PENRIL CORP 37 32 59 137 13 118 97 
PERSONAL DIAGNOSTICS 38 218 1 9 136 5 87 
PORTEC 39 27 95 106 0 188 40 
READING & BATES CORP 40 18 12 198 1 195 32 
RONSON 41 16 44 168 7 142 79 
SCIENTIFIC RADIO 4'2 116 7 105 187 6 35 
STANDARD LOGIC 43 5 130 93 9 6 213 
STRATA CORP 44 78 9 141 188 6 34 
STRUTHERS WELLS CORP 45 4 56 168 1 136 91 
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GOING CONCERN PORTFOLIO, Cont. 
COMPANY NAME MATCH # FIRST PERIOD SECOND PERIOD 
soc CDS NEUT soc CDS NEUT 
TEXFI INDS INC 46 22 106 100 31 48 149 
THORATEC LABS 47 214 0 14 78 0 150 
THOUSAND TRAILS 48 220 0 8 219 4 5 
WEAN INC 49 1 132 95 1 107 120 
WILTON ENT 50 195 1 32 5 0 223 
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